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DOES THE PUBLIC CARE HOW THE SUPREME 
COURT REASONS? EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
FROM A NATIONAL EXPERIMENT AND 
NORMATIVE CONCERNS IN THE CASE OF 
SAME-SEX MARRIAGE* 
COURTNEY MEGAN CAHILL** & GEOFFREY CHRISTOPHER RAPP*** 
Can the Supreme Court influence the public’s reception of 
decisions vindicating rights in high-salience contexts, like same-
sex marriage, by reasoning in one way over another? Will the 
people’s disagreement with those decisions—and, by extension, 
societal backlash against them—be dampened if the Court 
deploys universalizing liberty rationales rather than 
essentializing equality rationales? Finally, even if Supreme Court 
reasoning does resonate with the people as a descriptive matter, 
should the Court minimize anxiety-producing characteristics in 
decisions vindicating civil rights—such as homosexuality in the 
marriage-equality context—simply in order to assuage the 
people? 
This Article combines constitutional theory and empirical legal 
analysis to ask and answer each of these questions. It uses the 
Supreme Court’s disposition of a marriage-equality issue in 
United States v. Windsor as an opportunity to test empirically a 
theoretical claim made most recently by Professor Kenji 
Yoshino, namely that the Court’s reasoning in high-salience 
contexts resonates with the people. Yoshino was not the first to 
argue that Supreme Court reasoning matters to the public or that 
the Court ought to decide cases in a certain way in order to 
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influence the public’s reception of its decisions. He was, however, 
the first to argue that the Court ought to lead with liberty (rather 
than with equality) in a variety of contexts involving group-based 
civil rights because of liberty’s putative power to satisfy the 
people. 
Skeptical of Yoshino’s positive claim and troubled by his 
strategic advice to courts, we subjected his theory to empirical 
analysis by way of a national experiment. We conducted our 
experiment in May 2013—two months after oral argument in 
Windsor and Hollingsworth v. Perry, when the issue of same-sex 
marriage was fresh in the public’s mind—to determine whether 
the Court’s reasoning in a fictional same-sex marriage case 
affects the public. Consistent with our intuition, we did not find 
broad support for the notion that reasoning resonates with the 
people. Based in part on our results and in part on our normative 
reservations with Yoshino’s tactical advice, we believe that judges 
and commentators ought to approach Yoshino’s suggested 
strategy with restraint. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On June 26, 2013, the United States Supreme Court struck down 
section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”)1 and declined 
to rule on the merits in California’s “Proposition 8” case,2 leaving in 
place a district court ruling striking down California’s same-sex 
marriage prohibition on federal constitutional grounds.3 These two 
decisions are considered victories for marriage equality.4 They also 
virtually guarantee that in the not-too-distant future the United States 
Supreme Court will be asked to elaborate its view of the 
constitutionality of state laws restricting marriage to opposite-sex 
couples.5 
Let us suppose that the not-too-distant future is today and that 
the Supreme Court finds that same-sex marriage prohibitions are 
 
 1. See generally United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (striking down 
section 3 of DOMA as a violation of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause). Section 
3 of DOMA defined marriage in cross-sex terms for the purpose of federal benefits. 
Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 3, 110 Stat. 2419, 2419 (1996) (codified at 
1 U.S.C. § 7, 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2012)). 
 2. See generally Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (dismissing 
petitioners’ appeal for lack of standing under Article III, thereby reinstating the lower 
court’s decision striking down California’s exclusionary marriage initiative on federal 
constitutional grounds). 
 3. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 991 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (striking down 
a state constitutional marriage exclusion as a violation of the U.S. Constitution’s Due 
Process and Equal Protection Clauses). 
 4. See, e.g., Elizabeth Weise, San Francisco Celebrates Gay Marriage Rulings, USA 
TODAY (July 5, 2013, 12:51 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/
06/26/san-francisco-celebrates-gay-marriage-ruling/2461259/ (noting that “[a]fter both 
[Windsor and Hollingsworth] were announced, a line of politicians and gay activists . . . let 
out a roar of approval”). 
 5. Dan Levine, U.S. High Court Ruling Sets Up New Wave of Gay Marriage Battles, 
CHI. TRIB. (June 26, 2013), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2013-06-26/news/sns-rt-usa-
gayrightscampaignsl2n0f21jd-20130626_1_marriage-ban-marriage-rights-gay-marriage; see 
also Michael J. Klarman, Windsor and Brown: Marriage Equality and Racial Equality, 127 
HARV. L. REV. 127, 158 (2013) (“Within a few years of Windsor, as public support for gay 
marriage continues to increase and as more states enact it into law, one can imagine some 
Justices being tempted to extend that ruling to forbid the states from excluding same-sex 
couples from marriage. Indeed, the Windsor dissents of both Chief Justice Roberts and 
Justice Scalia seem mostly addressed to that eventuality . . . .”). 
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unconstitutional under the U.S. Constitution.6 Would the 
constitutional basis or bases on which such a decision rests matter to 
most people? Would people care whether the Court rendered a pro-
marriage-equality decision on equal protection grounds or on 
fundamental rights grounds? Does how the Court reasons in cases 
dealing with culturally contested issues like same-sex marriage 
resonate with the public? Or, will the public either embrace or oppose 
a Supreme Court decision in such cases regardless of the reasons that 
the Court offers in support of it? 
This paper combines empirical legal analysis and constitutional 
theory to begin to probe these (and related) questions. It presents an 
original empirical study on the relationship between judicial 
reasoning and public reception of a court decision.7 Its objective is 
part descriptive and part normative. Descriptively, it argues that 
judicial reasoning likely does not matter to the people, contrary to the 
claims of some legal commentators.8 Normatively, it argues that 
courts ought not to reason in one way over another in a certain subset 
of decisions vindicating group-based civil rights simply to alleviate the 
anxiety those decisions might provoke in the general public, as one 
prominent constitutional theorist, Kenji Yoshino, has recently 
suggested.9 
In the past, scholars of constitutional law have been concerned 
with what the Supreme Court should have said, but did not, in 
 
 6. A number of cases have been filed in the aftermath of Windsor and Hollingsworth 
challenging state same-sex marriage bans in both state and federal court; it is at the very 
least possible that one of them will find its way to the Supreme Court of the United States. 
See, e.g., Bishop v. U.S. ex rel. Holder, 962 F. Supp. 2d 1252, 1296 (N.D. Okla. 2014) 
(striking down Oklahoma’s constitutional marriage ban on federal equal protection 
grounds), aff’d, Nos. 14-5003, 14-5006, 2014 WL 3537847 (10th Cir. July 18, 2014); Kitchen 
v. Herbert, 961 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1216 (D. Utah 2013) (striking down Utah’s constitutional 
and statutory marriage ban on federal due process and equal protection grounds), aff’d, 
755 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 2014). During its October 2014 Term, the Supreme Court denied 
certiorari for all cases arising from challenges to state laws banning same-sex marriage, 
which left a split among the states regarding the issue. See, e.g., Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 
648, 653 (7th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 316 (2014); Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 
1193, 1198–99 (10th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 265 (2014); Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 
F.3d 352, 367–68 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 308 (2014); Bishop v. Smith, 760 
F.3d 1070, 1074 (10th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 271 (2014). 
 7. Our study contributes to a growing body of empirical research undertaken by 
political scientists on the relationship between decision attributes and public opinion. See, 
e.g., James R. Zink, James F. Spriggs II & John T. Scott, Courting the Public: The 
Influence of Decision Attributes on Individuals’ Views of Court Opinions, 71 J. POL. 909, 
910 (2009) (testing whether decisions with larger majorities and that follow precedent 
positively influence public opinion). 
 8. See infra Part II. 
 9. See infra Part VI. 
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landmark constitutional decisions like Brown v. Board of Education10 
and Roe v. Wade.11 Increasingly, scholars of constitutional law are 
interested in elaborating on how the Supreme Court should reason in 
potential future landmark cases, including a marriage-equality 
decision.12 Why is this? 
Scholars have offered several reasons for why the Court’s 
reasoning matters, particularly in cases involving deeply divisive 
issues like desegregation, abortion, and same-sex marriage. For some, 
the Court’s reasoning matters because it could impact a decision’s 
precedential value.13 For others, the Court’s reasoning matters 
because it could strengthen the constitutional basis for a particular 
right.14 For still others, the Court’s reasoning matters because it could 
 
 10. See generally 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (striking down laws separating the races in 
public education as a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause). 
 11. See generally 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (striking down Texas’s criminal abortion law and 
finding that the abortion right is protected as an aspect of privacy under the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause). For a sampling of this scholarly commentary, see, for 
example, ANITA L. ALLEN ET AL., WHAT ROE V. WADE SHOULD HAVE SAID 18–22 (Jack 
M. Balkin ed. 2005) (summarizing the authors’ revised opinions of Roe and noting that 
they “took a variety of different approaches to answer [the book’s central] question of 
what Roe v. Wade should have said”), and BRUCE ACKERMAN ET AL., WHAT BROWN V. 
BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID (Jack M. Balkin ed. 2001) (noting that a 
group of constitutional scholars was asked how they would “have written the Brown 
opinion”). 
 12. See generally Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747 
(2011) [hereinafter Yoshino, The New Equal Protection] (theorizing how the Supreme 
Court should reason); Kenji Yoshino, Tribe, 42 TULSA L. REV. 961 (2007) [hereinafter 
Yoshino, Tribe] (theorizing how the Supreme Court should reason). Professor Yoshino’s 
theory is elaborated more fully below. See infra Part I. 
 13. William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds, Elitism, Expediency, and the New 
Certiorari: Requiem for the Learned Hand Tradition, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 273, 282–85 
(1996). Consider here Brown v. Board of Education, which held that state-mandated 
separation of the races in public education was unconstitutional because it made African 
American schoolchildren feel inferior to whites. 347 U.S. at 494. The Brown Court has 
been criticized not for the result that it reached but rather for the reasoning on which that 
result rests—reasoning that putatively lacks “neutral principles” with clear applicability 
outside the public education context. See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of 
Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 22 (1959) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s 
decision to extend its Brown “ruling to other public facilities, such as public 
transportation, parks, golf courses, bath houses, and beaches, which no one is obliged to 
use––all by per curiam decisions” is not necessarily a “principled” one given Brown’s 
context-specific reasoning). If separate-but-equal was unconstitutional in public education 
because of how it made African American schoolchildren feel, then what of separate-but-
equal on public golf courses—or in any other context in which that repudiated legal 
doctrine was the law of the land? See MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL 
RIGHTS 321 (2004) (discussing the cases extending Brown’s holding to other contexts as 
well as contemporary criticism of them). 
 14. Consider here Roe v. Wade, which struck down Texas’s criminal abortion law on 
due process grounds and found that the federal Constitution protects the abortion right 
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help to contain the backlash that particular decisions produce in the 
court of public opinion.15 It is the conjectured relationship between 
judicial reasoning and public reception of a decision (and backlash 
against it) that concerns us here. In particular, we are interested in the 
recent argument advanced by Kenji Yoshino––namely, that courts 
can minimize the people’s pluralism anxiety, defined as 
“apprehension of and about . . . demographic diversity,”16 by 
vindicating civil rights on liberty rather than on equality grounds.17 To 
be sure, Professor Yoshino is not the first to argue that courts can 
influence the public’s reception of (and backlash against) judicial 
 
under the larger rubric of privacy. 410 U.S. at 164. Many commentators have argued that 
the Roe Court should have supported its holding on equality grounds because equality is a 
better constitutional basis for abortion rights than is privacy, given that privacy is 
mentioned nowhere in the Constitution whereas equality is and given that abortion laws 
affect women in both sex-specific and sex-stereotypical ways. See, e.g., Sylvia A. Law, 
Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955, 981 (1984) (arguing that 
abortion laws violate the Equal Protection Clause because they create a sex 
classification—only women can have an abortion because only women can get pregnant); 
see also Neil S. Siegel & Reva B. Siegel, Equality Arguments for Abortion Rights, 60 
UCLA L. REV. DISC. 160, 170 (2013) (arguing for a “synthetic understanding of the 
constitutional basis of the abortion right—as grounded in both liberty and equality 
values”); Reva B. Siegel, Sex Equality Arguments for Reproductive Rights: Their Critical 
Basis and Evolving Constitutional Expression, 56 EMORY L.J. 815, 816 (2007) (outlining 
the “constitutional arguments that have been advanced in a variety of doctrinal 
frameworks” in favor of a “sex equality approach to reproductive rights”); Reva B. Siegel, 
The New Politics of Abortion: An Equality Analysis of Woman-Protective Abortion 
Restrictions, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 991, 994 (arguing that “[a]n abortion ban reflecting and 
enforcing [gender stereotypes] violates constitutional guarantees of equal citizenship”); 
Cass R. Sunstein, Neutrality in Constitutional Law (with Special Reference to Pornography, 
Abortion, and Surrogacy), 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 36 (1992) (making the sex stereotype 
argument against restrictive abortion laws). Moreover, had the Court justified the 
abortion right on equality grounds, the abortion right would be secure even if Roe were 
reversed. See Reva B. Siegel, Concurring, in WHAT ROE V. WADE SHOULD HAVE SAID 
63, 63 (Jack M. Balkin ed. 2005). Roe also illustrates how the Court’s reasoning in a 
particular decision can affect that decision’s precedential scope, as discussed earlier in the 
context of Brown. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. Had Roe been decided on 
equality grounds, some commentators maintain, it could have been strong authority for 
why the government’s refusal to cover even medically necessary abortions for indigent 
women was unconstitutional, even though the Court held otherwise in cases after Roe. See, 
e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 318 (1980) (holding that the abortion right does not 
require the state to fund non-therapeutic abortions of Medicaid recipients). 
 15. See Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, supra note 12, at 796–97 (arguing that the 
Supreme Court can “fashion a new, more inclusive sense of ‘we’ ” by reasoning in one way 
over another in decisions addressing issues that might otherwise provoke the people’s 
“pluralism anxiety”). 
 16. Id. at 751. 
 17. Id. at 750 (arguing that the “liberty-based dignity claim” is a “way for the Court to 
‘do’ equality in an era of increasing pluralism anxiety”). 
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decisions by reasoning in one way over another in their opinions.18 
Most notably, Justice Ginsburg has argued that “[t]he Roe decision 
might have been less of a storm center had it . . . homed in more 
precisely on the women’s equality dimension of the issue.”19 Under 
this view, justifying the abortion right on equality rather than on 
privacy grounds might have muted Roe’s ostensible social and 
political backlash20—at least among academics but possibly among 
the public as well—because people would have been more willing to 
accept (or at least tolerate) abortion had they understood the deep 
relationship between a woman’s reproductive autonomy and her 
“ability to stand in relation to man, society, and the state as an 
independent, self-sustaining, equal citizen.”21 
Yoshino is, however, the first to argue that courts should 
foreground liberty and minimize equality in a whole swath of cases 
involving group-based civil rights. In his view, liberty justifications for 
civil rights—of the sort relied on by the Supreme Court in Lawrence 
v. Texas22—can dampen the angst that equality justifications 
 
 18. Justice Ginsburg has argued that by avoiding “giant strides” in constitutional 
adjudication, a court can reduce the risk of producing a “backlash too forceful to contain.” 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1185, 1208 (1992) 
[hereinafter Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice]. 
 19. Id. at 1200; see also Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and 
Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375, 382 (1985) [hereinafter 
Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade] 
(arguing that “[a]cademic criticism of Roe . . . might have been less pointed had the Court 
placed the woman alone, rather than the woman tied to her physician, at the center of its 
attention”). But see id. at 382 (“I do not pretend that, if the Court had added a distinct sex 
discrimination theme to its medically oriented opinion, the storm Roe generated would 
have been less furious.”). 
 20. We say “ostensible” because the Roe backlash thesis—the claim that Roe 
precipitated backlash against both the abortion right and the Court—has recently 
undergone serious critique. See LINDA GREENHOUSE & REVA SIEGEL, BEFORE ROE V. 
WADE: VOICES THAT SHAPED THE ABORTION DEBATE BEFORE THE SUPREME 
COURT’S RULING 253 (2010) (questioning the Roe backlash thesis); Linda Greenhouse & 
Reva B. Siegel, Backlash to the Future? From Roe to Perry, 60 UCLA L. REV. DISC. 240, 
242 (2013) [hereinafter Greenhouse & Siegel, Backlash to the Future?] (questioning “the 
one-dimensional story of court-centered backlash so often attributed to Roe”); Linda 
Greenhouse & Reva B. Siegel, Before (and After) Roe v. Wade: New Questions About 
Backlash, 120 YALE L.J. 2028, 2030–31 (2011) (raising “questions about the conventional 
assumption that the Court’s decision in Roe is responsible for political polarization over 
abortion”). 
 21. Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 
supra note 19, at 383 (citing Kenneth L. Karst, Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1, 57–59 (1977)). 
 22. See generally 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (striking down Texas’s criminal sodomy law on 
due process grounds and finding that the federal Constitution protects a limited right to 
sexual autonomy). 
CITE AS 93 N.C. L. REV. 303 (2015) 
310 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93 
ostensibly provoke (or at least do nothing to alleviate) in the general 
public.23 We describe Yoshino’s theory in greater detail in Part I. 
Suffice it to say here that Yoshino contends that pluralism anxiety is a 
good reason why the Court should continue to vindicate civil rights on 
liberty rather than on equality grounds, as it did in Lawrence.24 While 
“liberty claims [might not] quash [pluralism] anxiety altogether,” 
Yoshino admits, they “do so more than equality claims.”25 Assuming 
“courts . . . believe something is at stake in how [civil rights] claims 
are framed,”26 he argues, they ought to follow Lawrence’s lead of 
vindicating rights on the basis of liberty rather than equality.27 In this 
sense, Yoshino advances the conversation initiated by other scholars 
about the Court’s ability to influence the public’s reception of its 
decisions. Cass Sunstein has argued that the Court can limit public 
backlash by deciding “minimally.”28 Other commentators have argued 
that the Court can control public backlash by not deciding at all.29 
Yoshino appears to suggest that the Court can alleviate the people’s 
pluralism anxiety—and, by extension, control public backlash30—by 
deciding in a certain way. Indeed, we interpret Yoshino’s pluralism-
 
 23. See infra Part I. 
 24. Yoshino made this argument before its appearance in the Harvard Law Review. 
See, e.g., Yoshino, Tribe, supra note 12, passim (setting forth his pluralism anxiety theory 
in a symposium tribute to Laurence Tribe); Kenji Yoshino, Gerken-Yoshino Debate on 
Liberty and Equality, Round 2, SLATE (May 22, 2008, 10:17 AM), http://www.slate.com/
blogs/convictions/2008/05/22/gerken_yoshino_debate_on_liberty_and_equality_round_2.ht
ml [hereinafter Yoshino Debate]. 
 25. Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, supra note 12, at 794. 
 26. Id. 
 27. See id. at 778 (praising Lawrence’s liberty rationale as one that “quieted pluralism 
anxiety”). 
 28. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE 
SUPREME COURT 4–6 (1999) [hereinafter SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME]; Cass R. 
Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4, 6–8 (1996) 
[hereinafter Sunstein, Leaving Things Undecided]. 
 29. See, e.g., KLARMAN, supra note 13, at 6–7 (describing how courts can avoid public 
backlash); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Backlash Politics: How Constitutional Litigation Has 
Advanced Marriage Equality in the United States, 93 B.U. L. REV. 275, 278 (2013) (using 
pluralism reinforcing theory to argue when courts should and should not incite backlash); 
Michael J. Klarman, Civil Rights Law: Who Made It and How Much Did It Matter?, 83 
GEO. L.J. 433, 433 n.4 (1994) [hereinafter Klarman, Civil Rights Law] (discussing the 
Brown “backlash thesis”); Michael Klarman, How Brown Changed Race Relations: The 
Backlash Thesis, 81 J. AM. HIST. 81, 117–18 (1994) [hereinafter Klarman, How Brown 
Changed Race Relations]; Michael Klarman, Harvard Law School, Hart Lecture at 
Georgetown Law Center: Courts, Social Change, and Political Backlash (Mar. 31, 2011) 
[hereinafter Klarman Lecture] (discussing the disruptive backlash that resulted from 
judicial decisions in high-salience contexts like desegregation and marriage equality). 
 30. For a description of the relationship between pluralism anxiety and backlash, see 
infra notes 78–91 and accompanying text. 
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anxiety theory as a backlash-minimizing device, as pluralism anxiety 
is a necessary condition for public backlash to occur. We describe the 
relationship between pluralism anxiety and backlash in greater detail 
below.31 
But do the people—the group whose pluralism anxiety Yoshino 
appears to care about the most—believe that something is at stake in 
the way civil rights claims are framed? Will Americans be more 
willing to accept a Supreme Court decision vindicating marriage 
equality for same-sex couples if that decision is grounded in liberty, 
“emphasiz[ing] what all Americans . . . have in common,” rather than 
in equality?32 Our study empirically tests the claim that how the Court 
reasons in decisions vindicating civil rights actually matters to the 
public. We chose to test Yoshino’s particular theory of “pluralism 
anxiety” because he is the first to argue that the “how” matters in any 
case involving group-based civil rights—as opposed to, say, Justice 
Ginsburg, who has more modestly suggested that the “how” might 
have mattered in the abortion context specifically.33 Moreover, we 
thought it was important to subject Yoshino’s theory to empirical 
study because Yoshino provides no evidence to substantiate his claim 
that the Supreme Court’s reasoning actually resonates with the 
people. This oversight is curious, especially given that reasoning’s 
ostensible relevance constitutes the very basis for Yoshino’s principal 
normative argument (the one with which we have strong normative 
reservations), namely that courts ought to foreground liberty in 
decisions vindicating group-based civil rights.34 
 
 31. See infra note 78–91 and accompanying text. 
 32. Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, supra note 12, at 796. 
 33. In fact, Yoshino and Ginsburg differ in an even more fundamental way than the 
relative scope and applicability of their theories. Whereas Yoshino argues that liberty-
based rationales are more appealing to the public, Ginsburg argues that an equality-based 
rationale for the abortion right specifically would have been more appealing to the public. 
Compare Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, supra note 12, at 792–94 (arguing that 
liberty-based rationales “may appeal to the libertarian streak in some conservatives” and 
generally have a greater “effect on quieting pluralism anxiety” than equality-based 
rationales), with Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, supra note 18, at 1200 (“The Roe 
decision might have been less of a storm center had it [] homed in more precisely on the 
women’s equality dimension of the issue . . . .”). She roots this belief in the fact that 
starting in the 1970s, the public was very supportive of Supreme Court decisions striking 
down sex-specific laws on equality grounds. See Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 
supra note 18, at 1200.  
 34. This oversight is also curious in light of existing empirical accounts of Supreme 
Court opinions and the American public—accounts which suggest that “large portions of 
the American public are unaware even of major decisions like Roe v. Wade.” Gerald N. 
Rosenberg, Romancing the Court, 89 B.U. L. REV. 563, 567 (2009); see also NATHANIAL 
PERSILY, JACK CITRIN & PATRICK J. EGAN, PUBLIC OPINION AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
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For reasons explained below, our initial intuition was that the 
Court’s reasoning in constitutional cases involving divisive issues like 
same-sex marriage and abortion would not quiet any pluralism 
anxiety or contain any backlash35 that those cases produce. If the 
Supreme Court as an institution does not cause a distinctive backlash 
in the public—as scholars David Fontana and Donald Braman have 
recently found36—then our intuition was that the Supreme Court 
could not contain backlash through the reasoning that it employs. 
In 2012, Professors Fontana and Braman published the findings 
of an empirical study on institutional backlash.37 Their findings 
arguably cast doubt on Yoshino’s thesis, but they do not actually test 
it.38 In brief, Fontana and Braman examined whether the public 
reacted more strongly when the Court decided an ideologically 
divisive issue like same-sex marriage than when Congress decided 
that issue.39 Conventional wisdom on backlash posits that the Court, 
because of its intrinsic institutional features and the so-called 
“counter-majoritarian difficulty,”40 causes a distinctive backlash in the 
court of public opinion.41 Fontana and Braman found that this was 
not the case, and that people’s “cultural priors,” rather than any pre-
existing institutional preference, best predicted how they would react 
 
CONTROVERSY 8 (2008) (surveying empirical data that overwhelmingly suggest that 
“Supreme Court decisions had no effect on the overall distribution of [the American] 
public opinion”). 
 35. We discuss the relationship between pluralism anxiety and backlash below. See 
infra notes 76–91 and accompanying text. 
 36. David Fontana & Donald Braman, Judicial Backlash or Just Backlash?, 112 
COLUM. L. REV. 731, 735 (2012) [hereinafter Fontana & Braman, Judicial Backlash] 
(reporting the results of a national survey that tested whether the public was less 
supportive of rights-enhancing decisions if they were issued by the Supreme Court rather 
than by Congress); see also Donald Braman & David Fontana, The New Republic: 
Supreme Anxiety, NPR (Jan. 19, 2012, 9:02 AM), http://www.npr.org/2012/01/19/
145445550/the-new-republic-supreme-anxiety [hereinafter Braman & Fontana, Supreme 
Anxiety] (summarizing the Columbia Law Review piece for a more wide-spread audience). 
 37. See Fontana & Braman, Judicial Backlash, supra note 36, at 735. 
 38. Professors Fontana and Braman empirically tested whether it matters to the 
public if Congress or the Supreme Court decides a high salience issue like same-sex 
marriage, not whether it matters to the public if the Court decides a high salience issue in a 
particular way. See id. at 734–35 (summarizing their study and its results). 
 39. Id. at 734. 
 40. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME 
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16 (1962) (“The root difficulty is that judicial review is a 
counter-majoritarian force in our system.”). 
 41. Fontana & Braman, Judicial Backlash, supra note 36, at 740–41. 
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to the resolution of a high-salience issue by either the Court or 
Congress.42 
Our study, like Fontana and Braman’s, experimentally tests a 
common constitutional law claim, albeit on a more granular level. 
Whereas Fontana and Braman focus on whether the Supreme Court 
causes a distinctive public backlash,43 we focus here on whether the 
Supreme Court’s reasoning in cases dealing with divisive issues like 
same-sex marriage contains public backlash. Whereas Fontana and 
Braman focus on whether the public cares if the Supreme Court 
decides important constitutional law issues,44 we focus here on 
whether the public cares if the Supreme Court employs particular 
justifications over others when deciding those issues—and, more 
narrowly, when deciding those issues in a way that ultimately 
vindicates a constitutional right. 
We chose to focus on the issue of same-sex marriage for three 
reasons. First, Yoshino contends that leading with liberty in a 
marriage case would be more appealing to the public.45 Second, the 
issue of same-sex marriage, considered in June 2013 by the Supreme 
Court in two high-profile cases and currently under review in a 
number of state and federal courts,46 is very much in the public eye. 
Moreover, Michael Klarman recently argued that a Supreme Court 
decision establishing a national marriag- equality precedent—the so-
called “ ‘fifty state’ solution”—is well within the realm of possibility 
for the near future.47 Thus, we believe that the time is ripe to test the 
public’s response to such a precedent. Third, our normative 
reservations with Yoshino’s theory center on that theory’s application 
to the class of people most directly affected by a same-sex marriage 
decision: sexual minorities. 
Our results, explained at greater length in the Parts that follow, 
did not overcome our intuition that the precise reasoning employed 
by the Court (when vindicating a civil right like same-sex marriage) 
has little impact on the public. While we found some evidence that 
the public is less likely to accept a same-sex marriage decision 
justified on equality grounds than one justified on liberty grounds or 
 
 42. Id. at 746 (“[W]e find in our study that cultural priors are much stronger 
predictors of behavior than other attitudinal priors.”). 
 43. See id. at 742. 
 44. Id. at 734. 
 45. See Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, supra note 12, at 793–94. 
 46. See supra notes 2–3, 6 and accompanying text. 
 47. See Klarman, supra note 5, at 128 (referring to the “ ‘fifty-state’ solution” of 
identifying “a federal constitutional right to same-sex marriage”). 
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which contains no justification at all, we did not find robust evidence 
in support of that proposition—certainly not robust enough to 
overcome our initial skepticism of Yoshino’s theory. Importantly, 
even if we had found a robust relationship between equality-based 
reasoning and decreased support for a Supreme Court decision 
vindicating marriage for same-sex couples, we would still reject 
Yoshino’s tactical advice to courts for normative reasons. 
More specifically, we believe that Yoshino’s tactical advice 
constitutes a form of judicial covering, defined as “ton[ing] down a 
disfavored identity to fit into the mainstream.”48 We find it curious 
that Yoshino, who has written eloquently on the subject of covering 
and who has criticized the covering demands that the law places on 
sexual minorities in particular,49 would advocate what we construe to 
be a form of judicial covering. The Supreme Court’s most recent gay-
rights decision, United States v. Windsor, engages in a similar sort of 
judicial covering that we find objectionable.50 We elaborate on this 
normative critique and on Windsor in Part VI. 
It is our position that courts ought to reject Yoshino’s theory on 
normative grounds alone. That said, we are aware that courts likely 
care about how the public receives their decisions51 and might 
therefore be tempted by Yoshino’s suggestion that liberty alleviates 
the anxiety that equality provokes. With that possibility in mind, it is 
our hope that the results of our study at the very least prompt courts 
to approach Yoshino’s tactical advice with restraint. Our study found 
 
 48. KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON OUR CIVIL RIGHTS ix 
(2006) [hereinafter YOSHINO, COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT].  
 49. See generally YOSHINO, COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT, supra note 48 
(criticizing the covering demands that the law places on sexual minorities); Kenji Yoshino, 
Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769 (2002) [hereinafter Yoshino, Covering] (explaining the 
problem of judicial covering). Yoshino has also written about the law’s erasure of sexual 
minorities. See generally Kenji Yoshino, Assimilationist Bias in Equal Protection: The 
Visibility Presumption and the Case of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” 108 YALE L.J. 487 (1998) 
(arguing that the assimilationist bias contained in immutability and visibility factors of 
equal protection jurisprudence should be retired); Kenji Yoshino, The Epistemic Contract 
of Bisexual Erasure, 52 STAN. L. REV. 353 (2000) (seeking to explain why bisexuals are 
erased in society). 
 50. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2709 (2013); see infra notes 233–39 and 
accompanying text. 
 51. For opposing views on this question, compare Lawrence Baum & Neal Devins, 
Why the Supreme Court Cares About Elites, Not the American People, 98 GEO. L.J. 1515, 
1516 (2010) (“Supreme Court Justices care more about the views of academics, journalists, 
and other elites than they do about public opinion.”), with BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL 
OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND 
SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION 367–68 (2009) (arguing that the Supreme 
Court is responsive to public opinion in its decisionmaking). 
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that there is probably little to lose as a positive matter should courts 
foreground equality over liberty in a same-sex marriage decision. It is 
our contention, however, that there is quite a bit to lose as a 
normative matter should courts go that route. 
Part I sets forth in greater detail Yoshino’s pluralism-anxiety 
theory, and Part II discusses our positive reservations with it. Part III 
describes our methodology, Part IV reports our results, and Part V 
offers discussion. Part VI closes with the normative reservations that 
prompted us to undertake this study in the first place. 
I.  THE THEORY: MINIMIZING PLURALISM ANXIETY WITH LIBERTY 
Kenji Yoshino is not the first person to suggest that Supreme 
Court reasoning in any particular decision can affect the way in which 
that decision is received by various constituencies outside the Court.52 
He is, however, the first person to argue that the Court ought to 
foreground liberty rationales in any decision vindicating civil rights on 
the theory that liberty is more likely than equality to quell the 
“pluralism anxiety” that any such decision will provoke in the 
“people.”53 Our study is limited to testing an important—and until 
now untested—aspect of this more specific claim. Before turning to it, 
a more complete description of Yoshino’s theory and of our positive 
reservations with it is necessary. 
Yoshino’s theory has both a descriptive and a normative 
dimension, both of which center on what he calls “pluralism 
anxiety.”54 Defined as the country’s “apprehension of and about its 
demographic diversity,”55 pluralism anxiety is weighing all of us down. 
Citing the work of political scientist and Bowling Alone author, 
Robert Putnam, Yoshino argues that increased racial, ethnic, and 
sexual diversity in the United States has led to decreased “social 
solidarity and . . . social capital.”56 While we might “celebrate 
 
 52. See supra notes 13–21 and accompanying text. 
 53. Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, supra note 12, at 794. Like Yoshino, other 
scholars have argued against using equality-based and identity-based reasoning. See, e.g., 
Jessica Knouse, From Identity Politics to Ideology Politics, 2009 UTAH L. REV. 749, 785. 
 54. See Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, supra note 12, at 751. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 752 n.37 (citing Robert D. Putnam, E Pluribus Unum: Diversity and 
Community in the Twenty-First Century, 30 SCANDINAVIAN POL. STUD. 137, 138 (2007) 
[hereinafter Putnam, E Pluribus Unum]). Putnam is the author of the landmark book 
Bowling Alone, which posited a link between increasing diversity in the United States and 
decreasing “social capital.” ROBERT PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE 352 (2000). Putnam’s 
studies are limited to ethnic and racial diversity, see Putnam, E Pluribus Unum, supra note 
56, at 138–39, whereas Yoshino posits that diversity generally—including gender diversity 
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diversity” in theory,57 we are exhausted by it in fact—so much so that 
we are experiencing “less happiness and lower perceived quality of 
life”58 and desiring “a recommitment to the ideals of assimilation and 
integration.”59 
No less than it is affecting “we, the people,” pluralism anxiety is 
affecting the Supreme Court. “Just as the War on Terror has 
transformed our separation of powers jurisprudence and the internet 
has transformed our First Amendment obscenity jurisprudence,” 
Yoshino argues, “pluralism anxiety has pressed the Court away from 
traditional group-based identity politics in its equal protection and 
free exercise jurisprudence.”60 Pluralism anxiety explains why the 
Court has placed limitations on heightened scrutiny classifications,61 
why the Court has foreclosed pure disparate impact claims under the 
Constitution’s equality and free exercise guarantees,62 and why the 
Court has reined in Congress’s exercise of its enforcement power 
under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.63 In “each line of 
jurisprudence,” Yoshino observes, the Court “has alluded to 
pluralism anxiety,” thereby suggesting that its exhaustion with 
identity politics is driving it to close “three separate doors through 
which it had permitted the advancement of group-based civil rights 
under the Equal Protection Clause.”64 As a result, and at first blush, 
“[t]he future of constitutional civil rights . . . seems grim.”65 
Not so grim, however, as to suggest that “we are witnessing the 
end of constitutional civil rights in this country.”66 Yoshino argues 
that to compensate for the closure of various equality doors, the 
Court has turned to liberty—or, more precisely, to liberty-based 
dignity claims—when vindicating civil rights. While the Court “seems 
to understand pluralism as a challenge to a progressive agenda,” 
Yoshino remarks, “it has seen that challenge as one that can be 
overcome by using liberty analysis, which draws on a broader, more 
 
and sexual diversity—might be contributing to pluralism anxiety, see Yoshino, The New 
Equal Protection, supra note 12, at 747 (discussing diversity broadly in terms of religious, 
racial, ethnic, gender, and sexual diversity). 
 57. Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, supra note 12, at 754. 
 58. Id. at 753 (quoting Putnam, E Pluribus Unum, supra note 56, at 150).  
 59. Id. at 752. 
 60. Id. at 755 (citations omitted). 
 61. Id. at 755–63. 
 62. Id. at 763–68. 
 63. Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, supra note 12, at 768–73. 
 64. Id. at 774. 
 65. Id. at 776. 
 66. See id. 
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inclusive form of ‘we.’ ”67 Unlike essentializing equality claims, liberty 
claims can bridge the differences between us, sounding as they do in a 
“universal register.”68 He says: 
The new equal protection paradigm stresses the interests we 
have in common as human beings rather than the demographic 
differences that drive us apart. In this sense, the shift from the 
“old” to the “new” equal protection could be seen as a 
movement from group-based civil rights to universal human 
rights.69 
To exemplify this shift from the “old” to the “new” equal 
protection, Yoshino offers Lawrence v. Texas,70 in which the Supreme 
Court struck down Texas’s sodomy statute on liberty rather than on 
equality grounds.71 There, Yoshino reminds us, the Court reasoned 
that “the statute violated the fundamental right of all persons—
straight, gay, or otherwise—to control their intimate sexual 
relations.”72 In Yoshino’s view, the Court decided Lawrence on a 
liberty theory because of its exhaustion with the “old” equality 
“paradigm.”73 He claims that “by deciding Lawrence on liberty 
grounds, the Court quieted pluralism anxiety.”74 
When Yoshino says that the Lawrence Court “quieted pluralism 
anxiety,” presumably he means that it quieted the public’s anxiety,75 
 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 793. 
 69. Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, supra note 12, at 793.  
 70. Id. at 776 (citing 539 U.S. 558 (2003)). 
 71. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (striking down Texas’s sodomy 
statute on federal due process grounds); id. at 575 (explaining the inadequacies of striking 
down Texas’s sodomy statute on federal equal protection grounds). 
 72. Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, supra note 12, at 777. 
 73. See id. at 777–78. For a more tempered reading of the Lawrence Court’s turn 
toward liberty, see Russell K. Robinson, Uncovering Covering, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1809, 
1827 (2007) (reviewing YOSHINO, COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT, supra note 48, and 
stating that “[t]he cases [Yoshino] cites as leading the way toward his liberty-based model 
are also revealing. To the extent that Lawrence v. Texas . . . discussed liberty or 
universality, [its] actual holding[] clearly benefited outsiders, with hardly any impact on 
insiders.” (citations omitted)).  
 74. Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, supra note 12, at 778. Some commentators 
have argued that Lawrence was more polarizing than Yoshino suggests. See, e.g., Patrick J. 
Egan & Nathaniel Persily, Court Decisions and Trends in Support for Same-Sex Marriage, 
THE POLLING REPORT, Aug. 2009, at 1, 6 (discussing the backlash that Lawrence initially 
precipitated). 
 75. See Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, supra note 12, at 778. A plausible but less 
compelling interpretation would be that Yoshino meant to describe the effect of the 
Court’s opinion on pluralism anxiety among elites (such as political and media elites). 
Even if that is the case (perhaps suggested by who would be making a “charge” against the 
Court), the reason why elite reaction might matter is that it can shape public reaction. 
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given that he immediately follows that assertion by saying: “The 
Court evaded the charge that it was picking and choosing among 
groups by highlighting that the right in question belonged to all 
persons within the United States.”76 In other words, Yoshino suggests 
that liberty not only minimizes the Court’s pluralism anxiety, but also 
inoculates the Court from the “charge” that it is playing favorites 
among identity groups.77 
Even more, Yoshino suggests that liberty is the judicial antidote 
to the people’s pluralism angst, and for that reason might help to 
contain any backlash that Court decisions vindicating the rights of 
minority groups are thought to precipitate.78 Although Yoshino does 
not explicitly say so, his theory suggests that courts might play a role 
in containing the public’s backlash in culturally contested cases—like 
same-sex marriage, the focus of our study—by reasoning one way 
over another. To be sure, pluralism anxiety and backlash are distinct 
concepts; the former denotes an uncomfortable feeling, whereas the 
latter denotes a strong reaction against something (such as a court 
decision or a court itself) that can have negative consequences.79 
Yoshino’s pluralism anxiety is a feeling provoked by the increasing 
diversity in society, whereas backlash is an antagonistic reaction 
provoked by judicial decisions.80 At least on its face, then, Yoshino’s 
pluralism-anxiety theory does not directly tell us anything about 
backlash or about the Court’s ability to contain backlash through its 
reasoning. 
 
 76. Id. at 777–78. 
 77. See id. 
 78. Id. at 754 (arguing that “the United States Supreme Court might help 
create . . . ‘[a] new, broader sense of “we” ’ ” through its constitutional jurisprudence 
(quoting Putnam, E Pluribus Unum, supra note 56, at 139)). 
 79. The term “backlash” is susceptible to multiple interpretations. We argue that 
backlash involves mobilized political action to reverse and/or erode a judicial decision. 
While a lack of “acceptance” or “agreement” with a decision is not the same as backlash, 
acceptance of a decision (or agreement with it) would seem to deny the field of battle to 
elites seeking to create a public backlash (or at least to make it harder for them to achieve 
victory on it). For a more complete definition of backlash and a history of its use in law, 
see Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373, 388–91 (2007). 
 80. To be sure, it does not have to be judicial decisions, see Greenhouse & Siegel, 
Backlash to the Future?, supra note 20, at 243 n.2 (“Backlash . . . is not limited to courts.”), 
although conventional wisdom says that courts provoke backlash to a much greater degree 
than the two politically accountable branches, see id. (“The premise of the Roe backlash 
narrative is that there is something about the judicial declaration of minority rights that 
produces an especially virulent and polarizing reaction among losers who would not 
respond in a similar fashion to legislative defeat.”). Recent empirical findings suggest that 
this conventional wisdom may be wrong. See Fontana & Braman, Judicial Backlash, supra 
note 36, passim. 
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On close inspection, however, Yoshino’s theory indirectly posits 
a connection among pluralism anxiety, backlash, and judicial 
reasoning. An uncomfortable feeling, such as one emanating from 
pluralism anxiety, might be thought of as a necessary, but perhaps not 
sufficient, condition for backlash. The public, feeling uncomfortable, 
can be targeted for mobilization by elites, and that mobilization, by 
focusing reaction on a Court decision, ripens into backlash. The more 
the public is persuaded by an opinion, however, the less anxious it 
feels about the opinion—and the less likely it is to backlash against it. 
Liberty, in Yoshino’s view, performs that persuasive function. He 
says: “The universality of [liberty] claims will make them more 
persuasive [than equality claims] to many.”81 If backlash can occur 
when people are not persuaded by judicial decisions, then liberty 
presumably minimizes backlash (at least vis-à-vis equality) because it 
makes decisions “more persuasive” to the polity than equality can.82 
Indeed, for Yoshino, there is something about liberty that makes 
people more likely to agree with a judicial decision or to accept it as 
law. A decision justified using liberty (rather than equality) is less 
likely to trigger backlash, either against the decision or the Court that 
rendered it. 
It is for this reason that we interpret Yoshino’s pluralism-anxiety 
theory as a backlash-limiting mechanism. Where other constitutional 
theorists have argued that the Court can limit backlash either by 
deciding “minimally”83 or by not deciding at all (at least sometimes),84 
Yoshino appears to be suggesting that the Court can contain backlash 
by deciding in a certain way. 
Importantly, we do not read Yoshino as offering a complete 
explanation for the complicated process associated with backlash 
 
 81. Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, supra note 12, at 794. 
 82. See id. at 794. 
 83. See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra note 28, at 5; Sunstein, Leaving 
Things Undecided, supra note 28, at 8. 
 84. See, e.g., Eskridge, supra note 29, at 281–91 (using pluralism reinforcing theory to 
argue when courts should and should not incite backlash). See generally KLARMAN, supra 
note 13 (arguing that the Court’s narrow decision in Brown did more to encourage 
southern white opposition); Klarman, Civil Rights Law, supra note 29 (reviewing MARK 
TUSHNET, CIVIL RIGHTS LAW: THURGOOD MARSHALL AND THE SUPREME COURT, 
1936–1961 (1994), and discussing the Brown “backlash thesis”); Klarman, How Brown 
Changed Race Relations, supra note 29 (questioning Brown’s impact and arguing that 
Brown encouraged southern resistance to racial change); Klarman Lecture, supra note 29 
(discussing the disruptive backlash that resulted from judicial decisions in high-salience 
contexts like desegregation and marriage equality).  
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against judicial opinions.85 Instead, the “anxiety” he describes 
represents a form of immediate or “gut” response to a Court 
decision.86 Members of the public may not fully understand a Court 
decision yet react negatively to it based on the inclusion of particular 
words or concepts in the Court’s explanation for its holding.87 In this 
sense, the reaction that Yoshino anticipates to an equality-based 
decision resembles the kind of “implicit bias” that has attracted the 
serious attention of behavioral psychologists and legal scholars.88 The 
reaction Yoshino describes may be an intuitive, yet powerful, one, 
and we posit that a fully developed backlash is unlikely to occur 
where the public has a positive intuitive response but may occur when 
the public’s reaction is intuitively negative.89 We revisit the issue of 
implicit bias and its relationship to Yoshino’s pluralism-anxiety 
theory in Parts V and VI. 
Moreover, it is important to keep in mind that Yoshino does not 
consider liberty and equality in a vacuum; rather, his claim is that the 
liberty rationale suppresses pluralism anxiety (and possibly backlash) 
more than equality. In other words, his theory poses the comparative 
question of which mode of reasoning courts ought to choose––liberty 
 
 85. See Jeffrey Rosen, The Supreme Court: Judicial Temperament and the Democratic 
Ideal, 47 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 8 (2007) (describing backlash as a “complicated 
phenomenon”). 
 86. See Robert A. Garda, The White Interest in School Integration, 63 FLA. L. REV. 
599, 625 (2011) (describing how anxiety is a manifestation of implicit or unconscious bias). 
 87. See Deana A. Pollard, Unconscious Bias and Self-Critical Analysis: The Case for a 
Qualified Evidentiary Equal Employment Opportunity Privilege, 74 WASH. U. REV. 913, 
918 (1999) (explaining that even those with no conscious bias may react negatively as a 
result of subconscious bias). 
 88. See, e.g., Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124, 
1126–28 (2012) [hereinafter Kang, Implicit Bias]; Jerry Kang & Kristin Lane, Seeing 
Through Colorblindness: Implicit Bias and the Law, 58 UCLA L. REV. 465, 492–93 (2010); 
Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1506–12 (2005); Linda 
Hamilton Krieger & Susan T. Fiske, Behavioral Realism in Employment Discrimination 
Law: Implicit Bias and Disparate Treatment, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 997, 1061 (2006); Linda 
Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to 
Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1199–1200, 
1209–12 (1995) (discussing anti-discrimination law’s failure to capture implicit bias); 
Kristin Lane, Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Social Cognition and the Law, 3 
ANN. REV. L. AND SOC. SCI. 427, 428 (2007); Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, 
and Equal Protection: Reckoning With Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 318–23 
(1987) (discussing anti-discrimination law’s failure to capture unconscious racism); Justin 
D. Levinson, Superbias: The Collision of Behavioral Economics and Implicit Social 
Cognition, 45 AKRON L. REV. 591, 592–96 (2012); Philip E. Tetlock, Gregory Mitchell & 
L. Jason Anastasopoulos, Detecting and Punishing Unconscious Bias, 42 J. LEGAL STUD. 
83, 83–84 (2013).  
 89. See Fontana & Braman, Judicial Backlash, supra note 36, at 766 (“[A] base of 
support may insulate a Court decision from immediate backlash.”). 
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or equality. Under this account, equality does not necessarily provoke 
pluralism anxiety (and therefore backlash). Rather, it could simply 
fail to alleviate it.90 Nor does liberty completely eliminate pluralism 
anxiety, as Yoshino admits.91 As explained in greater detail below, 
our results provide limited support for the proposition that equality is 
less effective than liberty in garnering support for Supreme Court 
decisions vindicating civil rights—and therefore, by implication, less 
effective than liberty in curtailing pluralism anxiety.92 
If that understanding of Yoshino’s pluralism-anxiety theory is 
correct, then his theory is much more than just an explanation for why 
the Court has abandoned equality as a basis for vindicating civil 
rights. It is also a tactical recommendation for how the Court ought to 
decide group-based civil rights cases in the future. Yoshino frames the 
article where he presents his theory of pluralism anxiety, The New 
Equal Protection, in a way that throws this normative objective into 
relief. At the end of Part I of that article, where Yoshino describes 
pluralism anxiety, he states: “This Article considers how the United 
States Supreme Court might help create [a] ‘new, broader sense of 
“we” ’ through its constitutional jurisprudence.”93 In the final 
substantive part of his piece, Yoshino gives courts (or really the 
Supreme Court) the following advice: “[W]here a claim can be validly 
characterized as either a liberty-based or an equality-based dignity 
claim, it should be characterized as the former.”94 In other writings 
articulating his theory, Yoshino has been clear that his intention is to 
convince courts—rather than legislatures or litigators—to lead with 
the liberty argument when vindicating civil rights because of its 
anxiety-minimizing potential.95 His theory is exclusively juriscentric, 
and deliberately so. 
 
 90. Such an interpretation, however, is not implausible. If pluralism anxiety causes 
people to be less persuaded than they would otherwise be by a judicial decision, if being 
less persuaded by a judicial decision could eventually precipitate backlash against both it 
and the court that rendered it, and if equality at the very least does nothing to minimize 
pluralism anxiety (and might even exacerbate it), then it would be fair to say that equality 
rationales, on Yoshino’s view, precipitate backlash more than liberty rationales do. 
 91. Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, supra note 12, at 794 (acknowledging that 
“liberty claims [might not] quash [pluralism] anxiety altogether but . . . they do so more 
than equality claims”). 
 92. See infra Parts IV–VI. 
 93. Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, supra note 12, at 754 (quoting Putnam, E 
Pluribus Unum, supra note 56, at 139). 
 94. Id. at 792. 
 95. See, e.g., Yoshino Debate, supra note 24 (arguing that “the fact that I want the 
courts to lead with liberty does not mean that other bodies must do so as well”). 
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By his own admission, Yoshino is much more “confident” and 
less “tentative” about the descriptive dimension of his piece than he is 
about his strategic or normative recommendations.96 We share his 
restrained optimism about the normative “desirability of this shift” 
from equality to liberty,97 and articulate our normative reservations at 
greater length in Part VI. In fact, it was our normative reservations 
with Yoshino’s theory that prompted us to undertake our empirical 
inquiry—an inquiry whose results convince us that Yoshino’s lack of 
confidence “about the inevitability or desirability of [the] shift” he 
advocates is warranted.98 
II.  DOES JUDICIAL REASONING REALLY RESONATE WITH THE 
PEOPLE? 
In addition to our significant normative reservations with 
Yoshino’s theory, discussed below, we have a straightforward positive 
reservation: We doubt that Supreme Court reasoning actually 
resonates with the people enough for it to curtail the people’s 
pluralism anxiety. Subpart A sets forth the three reasons why we are 
skeptical of Yoshino’s normative claim. Subpart B supports our 
skepticism with empirical evidence on the relationship between 
judicial decisions and the public’s acceptance of them, both in general 
and in the particular context of marriage equality. 
A. Three Reasons for Skepticism 
To recall, Yoshino argues that “the United States Supreme Court 
might help create ‘[a] new, broader sense of “we” ’ ”99 by leading with 
liberty over equality in decisions vindicating civil rights. We have 
doubts about this claim for three interrelated reasons. 
First, we are skeptical that the public is sufficiently attuned to the 
reasoning of any single Supreme Court opinion to be persuaded by 
that reasoning. In other words, Yoshino’s claim conflicts with our 
intuitive belief that the general public is unfamiliar with the discrete 
aspects of a Supreme Court opinion, including whether or not the 
 
 96. Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, supra note 12, at 750 (stating that he is 
“confident in [his] descriptive claim that the Court shut doors in its equality jurisprudence 
in the name of pluralism anxiety and has opened doors in its liberty jurisprudence to 
compensate” but recognizing also that he is “less confident about the inevitability or 
desirability of this shift”). 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 754 (quoting Putnam, E Pluribus Unum, supra note 56, at 139). 
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Court vindicates a right on the basis of liberty or of equality.100 While 
Yoshino might be right that some Americans respect and have 
confidence in the Supreme Court—36% according to a July 2010 
Gallup poll101—it is unlikely that Americans would have more respect 
for the Court’s decisions in ideologically salient contexts like abortion 
and same-sex marriage because it reasons in one way over another. 
We suspect that how the Court reasons is too granular a concern for 
most people, even people who are interested in what the Supreme 
Court has to say.102 Moreover, even if some attributes of a Supreme 
Court decision have been experimentally found to influence the 
public’s acceptance of that decision, those attributes—whether the 
decision came from a divided Court and whether the decision follows 
or overrules precedent103—are highly visible to the public.104 Whether 
the Court vindicates the abortion or same-sex marriage right on the 
basis of privacy or of equality is not. 
Second, even if members of the public were sufficiently attuned 
to the reasoning of a Supreme Court opinion, we are skeptical that 
they could tell the difference between liberty-based reasoning and 
equality-based reasoning, given the close interrelationship between 
liberty and equality. Laurence Tribe has described liberty and 
equality as two strands in a single “double helix,” a hybrid right which 
he conceptualizes as “dignity.”105 Several Supreme Court opinions—
including, notably, Lawrence v. Texas—recognize the deep 
interconnectedness between constitutional equality and liberty 
 
 100. See Fontana & Braman, Judicial Backlash, supra note 36, at 774 (arguing with 
respect to the Lawrence opinion specifically that “[i]t would have been hard to focus on 
discrete elements of the opinion by the Court and tune out the pre-decision and post-
decision framing of the case”). 
 101. Government, GALLUP, http://www.gallup.com/poll/27286/Government.aspx (last 
visited Sept. 7, 2014); see Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, supra note 12, at 754 n.55. 
 102. Indeed, after canvassing the social science literature on the relationship between 
Supreme Court decisions and the American public, political scientist Gerald Rosenberg 
confidently asserts: “I could devote a considerable number of pages to reviewing the 
literature that uniformly finds most Americans do not have a clue as to what the Court is 
doing or has done.” Rosenberg, supra note 34, at 566. 
 103. See, e.g., Zink et al., supra note 7, at 923 (finding that the public is generally more 
receptive of Supreme Court decisions with larger majorities and that follow precedent). 
 104. See id. at 911 (stating that the two opinion attributes that the authors test “are 
among the most visible features of Court opinions both in Court decisions themselves and 
in the reporting of these decisions in the popular press and therefore among the most 
visible to the public”). 
 105. Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The “Fundamental Right” That Dare Not 
Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1898 (2004). 
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guarantees.106 Even Yoshino admits that these two guarantees are 
deeply interwoven.107 We suspect that these guarantees are so closely 
connected that it is difficult to determine when the Court is “doing” 
civil rights primarily on a liberty basis or primarily on an equality 
basis. For reasons explained in greater detail below, our study does 
not rule out the possibility that equality and liberty have become so 
intertwined that it is unlikely that one will ultimately have more 
purchase than the other in the court of public opinion. Because we 
tested the public’s receptivity to liberty reasoning and to equality 
reasoning separately, it remains uncertain how the public would 
receive a decision that incorporates both rationales nearly 
simultaneously.108 
Third and most relevant to our study, even if the public were 
attuned to Supreme Court reasoning and could differentiate between 
liberty and equality rationales in a single decision, we are skeptical 
that judicial reasoning would ultimately sway or persuade the people 
in the way that Yoshino envisions. Other than briefly citing two 
scholars who have suggested that casting group-based civil rights in 
more universal (and less identity-based) ways might yield positive 
results for those groups,109 Yoshino provides no empirical support for 
the proposition that Supreme Court reasoning can influence the 
public’s general response to Court decisions in high-salience contexts. 
 
 106. As Yoshino observes, Lawrence recognized the “hybrid structure” of equality and 
liberty when it asserted: “Equality of treatment and the due process right to demand 
respect for conduct protected by the substantive guarantee of liberty are linked in 
important respects, and a decision on the latter point advances both interests.” Lawrence 
v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003); Yoshino, Tribe, supra note 12, at 967. It is also worth 
mentioning that the fundamental right to marry has always, nearly since its inception, been 
considered alongside equality, or at least “equal access,” concerns. See, e.g., Martha 
Nussbaum, A Right to Marry?, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 667, 688 (2010); Nelson Tebbe & 
Deborah A. Widiss, Equal Access and the Right to Marry, 158 PENN. L. REV. 1375, 1413 
(2010). 
 107. Yoshino, Tribe, supra note 12, at 970 (“We should . . . recognize that liberty and 
equality are intertwined values.”). 
 108. The majority opinion in United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013), which 
struck down section 3 of DOMA as a violation of the Fifth Amendment and which we 
discuss at relative length in Part VI, might be one of these opinions. See Douglas NeJaime, 
Windsor’s Right to Marry, 123 YALE L.J. ONLINE 219, 220 (2013), available at 
http://www.yalelawjournal.org/pdf/1205_3mchpr78.pdf (arguing that while the Windsor 
majority technically struck down section 3 on equal protection grounds, it is “conceptually, 
if not doctrinally, a right-to-marry case”). 
 109. See Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, supra note 12, at 795 (citing Theda 
Skocpol, Targeting Within Universalism: Politically Viable Policies to Combat Poverty in 
the United States, in THE URBAN UNDERCLASS 411, 414 (Christopher Jencks & Paul E. 
Peterson eds., 1991), and Richard H. Pildes, The Future of Voting Rights Policy: From 
Anti-Discrimination to the Right to Vote, 49 HOW. L.J. 741 (2006)). 
CITE AS 93 N.C. L. REV. 303 (2015) 
2015] PUBLIC VIEWS OF JUDICIAL REASONING 325 
This is not surprising, given that there is a dearth of research on the 
link between reasoning and public reactions, something our study 
attempts to address.110 
B. Evidence Supporting Our Skepticism 
1.  Empirical Scholarship on the Public’s Reception of Supreme Court 
Decisions 
Recent empirical evidence on the relationship between Supreme 
Court decisions and the public’s reception of those decisions supports 
our skepticism of Yoshino’s claim that the Supreme Court can quell 
the public’s pluralism anxiety through the reasoning that it uses in 
high-salience contexts like same-sex marriage. For instance, empirical 
evidence on the link between decision attributes and public opinion111 
suggests that individuals’ ideological predispositions with respect to 
issues that the Court decides are the most significant predictor of how 
those individuals react to a Court decision.112 This is particularly the 
case for high-salience issues, like abortion, where the prior views of 
citizens will likely dominate the nuance of a Court’s decision in 
shaping public response.113 
Scholars empirically testing the relationship between decision 
attributes and public opinion have found an inverse relationship 
between visible decisional attributes, like majority size, and the 
ideological salience of the issue considered in a decision.114 As the 
 
 110. While there is a rich discourse on the relationship between Court decisions and 
the American public, see, e.g., Klarman Lecture, supra note 29 (discussing the disruptive 
backlash that resulted from judicial decisions in high-salience contexts like desegregation 
and marriage equality), there is little empirical data on the relationship between Court 
reasoning and the American public. 
 111. Although several commentators have theorized that a connection between 
decisional attributes and public acceptance of a decision exists, very few have subjected 
that theory to empirical analysis. See Zink et al., supra note 7, at 910 (stating that prior to 
the authors’ 2008 study there was “no convincing empirical evidence for the claim that the 
attributes of Court decisions have any influence on individuals’ perceptions of those 
decisions”). 
 112. See id. at 923 (observing that there is little empirical evidence that any particular 
attribute of a Court decision alters the public’s reaction to it); Patrick Egan & Jack Citrin, 
The Limits of Judicial Persuasion and the Fragility of Judicial Legitimacy 7 (July 2011) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://politics.as.nyu.edu/docs/IO/4819/egan
citrin.pdf. 
 113. Some scholars have found that the Court is more likely to affect opinion in regard 
to less controversial issues. See, e.g., VALERIE J. HOEKSTRA, PUBLIC REACTION TO 
SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 9 (2003). 
 114. See Michael F. Salamone, Judicial Consensus and Public Opinion: Conditional 
Response to Supreme Court Majority Size, 67 POL. RES. Q. 320, 320–21 (2014); Zink et al., 
supra note 7, at 910; Egan & Citrin, supra note 112, at 17–19.  
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authors of a recent study observe, “[T]he effects of [certain] decision 
attributes grow stronger as the ideological salience of the legal issue 
declined, so that we see the least consistent effects for the high-
salience issue of abortion and the most consistent effects for the low-
salience issue of bankruptcy.”115 
Others have similarly found that “it is only in ‘cases with low 
salience’ that large majorities have an effect on public attitudes.”116 In 
an unpublished article cited this August by The New York Times,117 
Cass Sunstein summarizes recent empirical evidence suggesting that 
unanimous decisions in culturally contested settings like same-sex 
marriage do not guarantee increased public acceptance of them,118 
despite some justices’ professed belief that judicial consensus 
promotes stability and enhances the Court’s legitimacy in the court of 
public opinion.119 Sunstein discusses the empirical work of political 
scientist Michael Salamone,120 who has found that “reaction to judicial 
consensus is dependent on the ideological salience of the issue 
involved”121 and that “the public is unmoved by the majority size in 
highly salient decisions.”122 
If visible decisional attributes (e.g., majority size, adherence to 
precedent) matter less for decisions dealing with high-salience issues 
like abortion, then we suspect that less prominent decisional 
attributes like judicial reasoning will matter significantly less for 
decisions dealing with those issues. The decisional attributes tested in 
the literature are not just more visible than judicial reasoning, they 
are also more comprehensible. An opinion is likely to be described in 
the media as “unanimous” or “divided,” or as “overruling” a well-
known prior case or leaving that case the settled law; the public also 
likely has a firm understanding of what those descriptions mean. If 
highly visible and easily understood characteristics do not affect 
 
 115. Zink et al., supra note 7, at 919. 
 116. Cass R. Sunstein, Unanimity and Disagreement on the Supreme Court 33, 
(Working Paper 2014) (quoting Salamone, supra note 114, at 321), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2466057. 
 117. Adam Liptak, On Supreme Court, Does 9-0 Add Up to More Than 5-4?, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 11, 2014, at A13 (citing Sunstein, supra note 116, at 33, and Salamone, supra 
note 114). 
 118. See Sunstein, supra note 116, at 32–34 (summarizing this empirical evidence). 
 119. See Liptak, supra note 117, at A13 (discussing Justice Ginsburg’s recent 
endorsement of the position that “closely divided rulings may be perceived to be less 
legitimate than united ones”). 
 120. See Sunstein, supra note 116, at 32–33. 
 121. Salamone, supra note 114, at 320. 
 122. Id.  
CITE AS 93 N.C. L. REV. 303 (2015) 
2015] PUBLIC VIEWS OF JUDICIAL REASONING 327 
public reaction in high-salience cases, it is hard to imagine how more 
submerged and complex characteristics could. 
Other recent empirical scholarship supports our skepticism that 
the Supreme Court can contain backlash through the reasoning that it 
employs.123 As mentioned earlier,124 David Fontana and Donald 
Braman have subjected the judicial backlash theory—the claim that 
the Supreme Court causes a distinctive backlash in the court of public 
opinion125—to empirical analysis, and with interesting results.126 
Fontana and Braman experimentally examined the following 
question: “Does it matter to members of the public whether it is the 
Supreme Court or Congress deciding important constitutional issues 
of the day?”127 Conventional wisdom suggests that the public reacts 
more strongly when the Court decides certain issues than when 
Congress decides those issues—that is, that judicial resolution of an 
issue (and, in particular, of an ideologically divisive issue) causes a 
distinctive public backlash that legislative resolution of that issue 
ostensibly avoids. 
Contrary to that wisdom, Fontana and Braman found that people 
generally do not care whether Congress or the Court decides 
important constitutional law issues.128 If people disagree with same-
sex marriage, then they will react quite negatively to either the Court 
or Congress as an institution were either to extend marriage to same-
sex couples. If people agree with same-sex marriage, then they will 
react quite positively to either the Court or Congress as an institution 
were either to extend marriage to same-sex couples.129 In other words, 
Fontana and Braman found that there is no distinctive public reaction 
when the Supreme Court decides constitutional issues, leading them 
to theorize that backlash against Congress can be just as strong as 
 
 123. We should mention that scholars have also contested the thesis that the Supreme 
Court caused a distinctive backlash in the court of public opinion in discrete cases by 
looking to history rather than to empirical analysis. Most notable here are Reva Siegel and 
Robert Post, who have used history to seriously undermine the Roe v. Wade backlash 
thesis, that is, the claim that Roe caused a social and political backlash, one that not only 
seriously undermined the public’s respect for courts but has also placed Roe and the 
abortion right that it upheld in perpetual peril. Post & Siegel, supra note 79, at 377 
(observing that for Roe’s progressive critics, “Roe illustrates the terrible consequences of 
judicial decisionmaking that provokes intense opposition”); see also id. at 406–07 nn.180–
82 (summarizing those critics’ arguments). 
 124. See supra notes 37–42 and accompanying text. 
 125. Fontana & Braman, Judicial Backlash, supra note 36, at 768. 
 126. Id. at 735. 
 127. Id. at 734. 
 128. See id. at 766–67. 
 129. See id. at 759. 
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backlash against the Court.130 People’s institutional preferences do 
not exist in a vacuum, Fontana and Braman found.131 Rather, those 
preferences are determined by whether those institutions resolve 
constitutional issues in a way that vindicates people’s cultural 
worldviews or “cultural priors.”132 This central holding from Fontana 
and Braman’s study has been reinforced by other empirical 
research.133 
We hypothesize that if the Supreme Court does not cause a 
distinctive backlash in the court of public opinion because of 
institutional features intrinsic to the Court, then it is highly unlikely 
that the Supreme Court’s reasoning in ideologically charged cases will 
contain public backlash. Fontana and Braman’s study suggests that 
cultural worldviews with respect to the issues that the Court decides 
drive people’s views of the Court more than anything else. If that is 
right, then it is unlikely that the Court can do much to change those 
worldviews through its reasoning.134 As Fontana and Braman 
themselves assert, “[I]n high-salience cases there is little chance the 
Court can convince opponents.”135 If people disagree with same-sex 
marriage, then it is unlikely that they will be more supportive if the 
Court rests a marriage-equality decision on liberty grounds rather 
than on equality grounds. In short, if the people do not care about 
who decides a constitutional issue, then why would they care about 
how a constitutional issue is decided? 
 
 130. Fontana and Braman did find some slight differences with respect to voter turnout 
following a decision by the Court versus one by Congress: “Regardless of whether the 
Court reached a conservative or liberal outcome, when the Court issued a major decision 
conservatives were slightly more likely to vote and liberals were slightly less likely to vote 
than if Congress had acted. However, these differences in turnout were not major.” 
Braman & Fontana, Supreme Anxiety, supra note 36. 
 131. See Fontana & Braman, Judicial Backlash, supra note 36, at 765–66 (discussing 
“contingent institutional preferences”). 
 132. Id. at 771. Fontana and Braman define “cultural priors” as “prior worldviews 
(‘priors’) that might be motivating one’s institutional preferences.” Id. at 734–35. 
 133. See Benjamin G. Bishin et al., Testing Backlash: The Influence of Political 
Institutions on Public Attitudes Toward Gay Rights 23–24 (May 5, 2013) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2279675. 
 134. Furthermore, even if one posits that Supreme Court Justices act rationally to try 
to promote their own policy preferences (and, in so doing, may try to constrain backlash 
against their policy views), see LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES 
MAKE 11 (1998), Justices face considerable complexity in acting strategically. They must 
balance the degree to which a particular decision promotes their policy goals as well as its 
effects on institutional legitimacy and the likelihood that it will trigger a reaction by 
Congress. See id. at 11–14. 
 135. Fontana & Braman, Judicial Backlash, supra note 36, at 782. 
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An unpublished paper by political scientists Patrick Egan and 
Jack Citrin provides support for our hypothesis.136 Egan and Citrin 
conducted a two-wave experiment to evaluate whether the reasoning 
used by the Supreme Court affects the public’s attitude towards the 
decisions themselves and the public’s belief in the legitimacy of the 
Court.137 Egan and Citrin began by assessing respondent attitudes 
toward abortion, flag burning, the decriminalization of same-sex 
relations, limits on campaign finance, assignment of public school 
students by race, and handgun ownership bans.138 One half of 
respondents were provided with a one-sentence description of the 
reasoning used in a case and the other half were provided with no 
such description.139 
In five of the six issues studied, Egan and Citrin found that 
learning of the Court’s reasoning had no effect on the public’s attitude 
toward the decision.140 Learning the Court’s reasoning had “relatively 
paltry effects,”141 they write. The authors conclude that the Court’s 
“power to shift mass opinions towards accepting its rulings was 
essentially nil.”142 The sole exception was Lawrence v. Texas, where 
the Court decriminalized same-sex sex.143 Learning that the decision 
was based on the right to privacy moved opinion towards the Court’s 
decision.144 The authors dismiss that result, however, as inconsistent 
with the actual reaction observed in the public; in the aftermath of 
Lawrence, they note, support for criminalization of same-sex relations 
actually increased (albeit somewhat temporarily).145 Egan and Citrin’s 
finding that the Court’s reasoning has no effect on public opinion 
 
 136. See generally Egan & Citrin, supra note 112 (finding that the “persuasive powers” 
of the Supreme Court are limited). 
 137. Id. at 10–11. 
 138. Id. at 10. 
 139. Id. at 11. 
 140. See id. at 14. 
 141. Id. at 22.  
 142. See id. at 15. 
 143. Id. at 23. 
 144. Id. at 15. 
 145. Id. at 2, 15–16; see also Nathaniel Persily, Patrick Egan & Kevin Wallsten, Gay 
Marriage, Public Opinion and the Courts 17 (Apr. 29, 2006) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at http:///www.law.upenn.edu/fac/npersily/gaymarriagessrn.pdf (“Before 
Lawrence only 36 percent [of people surveyed] thought homosexual relations should be 
illegal; afterwards, that figure rose to 41 percent.”). Based on public polling, Persily and 
his colleagues show that the upsurge in hostility against same-sex sexual relations that 
occurred immediately after Lawrence was decided in 2003 eventually subsided in 2005. See 
id. at 1 (stating that the post-Lawrence backlash “appears to have leveled off and even 
returned to pre-Lawrence levels by the summer of 2005”). 
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appears to undercut Yoshino’s argument that the mode of reasoning 
employed by the Court can constrain backlash. 
2.  Empirical Evidence on the Relationship Between Court Decisions 
and Public Support for Marriage Equality 
If Yoshino were correct in his prediction that equality incites (or 
fails to contain) pluralism anxiety, then what would we make of the 
fact that we have witnessed increased public support for gay rights 
over the past four years despite a consistent trend of courts deciding 
gay rights cases not just on an equality basis but also on the 
assumption that gays deserve special judicial scrutiny as a class under 
equality provisions in state constitutions? Arguably, this trend started 
with a few state marriage-equality cases where state supreme courts—
Connecticut, Iowa—decided a same-sex marriage case on equality 
grounds, finding that gays and lesbians constituted a quasi-suspect 
(rather than a non-suspect) class for the purpose of state 
constitutional equality guarantees.146 
Several federal district and appeals courts have since followed 
their lead, deciding to apply not rational basis review to laws that 
discriminate against gays and lesbians but rather heightened judicial 
scrutiny—also on the basis that gays as a class deserve that level of 
review.147 Importantly, since this trend started in 2009, public support 
for gay rights legislation in myriad domains—employment, marriage, 
the military—has only increased, and in some cases dramatically so.148 
 
 146. See generally Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008) 
(applying heightened scrutiny to sexual orientation classifications); Varnum v. Brien, 763 
N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009) (applying heightened scrutiny to sexual orientation 
classifications). Alternatively, one could assert that the rise in public support emanated 
from the liberty rationale espoused in Lawrence, but that would require some explanation 
for the evident lag between that decision and rising support for gay rights. 
 147. See, e.g., Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 179 (2d Cir. 2012) (applying 
heightened scrutiny to sexual orientation classifications), aff’d, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013); 
Pedersen v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 881 F. Supp. 2d 294, 326 (D. Conn. 2012) (applying 
heightened scrutiny to sexual orientation classifications); Golinski v. U.S. Office of Pers. 
Mgmt., 824 F. Supp. 2d 968, 985–90 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (applying heightened scrutiny to 
sexual orientation classifications). 
 148. With respect to employment, a recent poll by the Human Rights Campaign 
(“HRC”) found that 73% of 2012 likely voters supported a federal law banning sexual 
orientation discrimination in employment; 60% of self-identified conservative voters 
supported such a ban. See Americans Overwhelmingly Support Executive Action to Ban 
Anti-LGBT Workplace Discrimination, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN, http://www.hrc.org/
resources/entry/americans-overwhelmingly-support-executive-action-to-ban-anti-lgbt-
workplac (last visited Sept. 14, 2014). With respect to marriage, in 2009, 40% of 
Americans supported same-sex marriage. See Jeffrey M. Jones, Majority of Americans 
Continue to Oppose Gay Marriage, GALLUP (May 27, 2009), http://www.gallup.com/
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This is all just to say that if Yoshino’s prediction were correct, then 
we would at least expect to see decreased support for gay rights 
following decisions grounded in equality. If anything, the data suggest 
just the opposite. 
Maybe the answer is that the public’s growing support for gay 
rights simply has nothing to do with judicial decisions; rather, that 
support results from changing demographics, greater exposure to gays 
and lesbians in popular culture, or advocacy efforts. But if that is the 
case, and the judicial decisions embracing gay rights on equality 
grounds have been simply irrelevant, that would seem to undermine 
Yoshino’s worry that decisions expanding rights on the basis of 
equality would reduce the public’s receptiveness to them. 
Given what we believe is a strong normative downside to 
Yoshino’s tactical advice—one considered at length in Part VI—we 
wanted to empirically test the positive foundation of his theory. 
Evidence of a robust link between Supreme Court reasoning and 
public opinion might outweigh the normative reservation we identify 
(for some of Yoshino’s audience, though not for us). However, 
evidence of a weak connection between the two variables that 
Yoshino assumes to be linked—Supreme Court reasoning and public 
opinion—would be even greater reason to approach his tactical 
advice with restraint. It is to that empirical inquiry that we now turn. 
III.  METHODOLOGY 
To test the relationship between the expressed rationale for 
rights-expanding Supreme Court decisions and the public’s reaction 
to those decisions, we employed a methodology adapted from several 
previous studies. We used the experimental vignette approach of 
Professor Zink and his colleagues.149 In addition, we used the survey 
 
poll/118378/Majority-Americans-Continue-Oppose-Gay-Marriage.aspx. As of July 2013, 
that number jumped twelve points. See Lydia Saad, In U.S., 52% Back Law to Legalize 
Gay Marriage in 50 States, GALLUP (July 29, 2013), http://www.gallup.com/poll/163730/
back-law-legalize-gay-marriage-states.aspx. With respect to the military, 75% of 
Americans supported the repeal of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” before its demise in 2011. See 
Brian J. McCabe, Public Opinion on ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,’ N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 30, 2010), 
http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/11/30/public-opinion-on-dont-ask-dont-tell/?
_r=0. Professor Katie Eyer also summarizes some of these developments. See Katie R. 
Eyer, Marriage This Term: On Liberty and the “New Equal Protection,” 60 UCLA L. REV. 
DISC. 2, 9 (2012). She argues that “these developments suggest a major transformation in 
the minds of a majority of Americans regarding the social meaning of LGB status.” Id. 
 149. See Zink et al., supra note 7, at 913. Professor Zink and his co-authors explore 
whether survey respondents, controlling for ideology, responded to decisional attributes 
such as the size of a Supreme Court’s majority coalition and whether the decision follows 
or overrules precedent. Id. The study exposed respondents to a brief newspaper article 
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sampling approach of Fontana and Braman, attempting to “replicate 
actual and potential real-world constitutional conflicts.”150 The 
experimental nature of our study is designed to “isolate the impact of 
the Court relative to other possible sources of influence” by 
minimizing the “noise of the outside world.”151 
We retained a private survey firm, Survey Sampling 
International, Inc. (“SSI”), to conduct the study.152 SSI maintains a 
standing panel reportedly numbering in the millions from which 
survey respondents can be drawn.153 The panel for our study was 
based on a Census-representative random selection of SSI panelists. 
That is, SSI attempted to match our sample’s demographic 
characteristics to those of the broader population. We requested a 
sample consisting of 1500 subjects. We divided this pool into three 
groups, each of which was exposed to a vignette describing a Supreme 
Court decision. 
Table 1 displays selected demographic data for our overall 
sample and each of the three treatment groups. Our panel had a 
median level of education of “completed some college” but not 
“college degree.”154 Forty-nine percent of our panel was female.155 
The mean age for our sample was forty-two.156 The median annual 
household income was between $30,000 and $39,000.157 
  
 
describing a fictional Supreme Court decision with the characteristics in question and then 
measured respondents’ agreement with and willingness to accept a decision. See id.  
 150. See Fontana & Braman, Judicial Backlash, supra note 36, at 754. 
 151. HOEKSTRA, supra note 113, at 25. Hoekstra uses panel data to evaluate whether 
Court decisions affect public support for the court. Id. at 3–4, 26–28.  
 152. SURVEY SAMPLING INT’L, INC., http://www.surveysampling.com (last visited Sept. 
10, 2014). 
 153. See N.J. Schweitzer et al., Neuroimages as Evidence in a Mens Rea Defense: No 
Impact, 17 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 357, 366–67 (2011). 
 154. This was also the median level of education for Fontana & Braman. See Fontana 
& Braman, Judicial Backlash, supra note 36, at 751. 
 155. Our sample had a slightly higher level of male participation than the Fontana & 
Braman study. See id. at 751. 
 156. This is several years younger than the Fontana & Braman study. See id. 
 157. This is one step lower than the level of income in the Fontana & Braman study. 
See id. 
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Internet,160 and to consider enrolling as members of SSI’s standing 
panel. 
Respondents were surveyed using SSI’s Dynamic platform.161 By 
participating in the survey, they received points which could (when 
accumulated with points earned for participation in other surveys) 
lead to the reward of a gift card. No other reward was provided to 
panelists for participation. Panelists were asked to verify their consent 
to the study and were told that they could exit the survey at any time 
if they were uncomfortable continuing.162 
We limited the focus of our study to subjects’ reactions to 
vignettes relating to same-sex marriage. The survey was administered 
in the second week of May 2013. This was approximately two months 
after the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in the DOMA163 and 
“Proposition 8” cases164 and was timed to precede the publication of 
the Court’s decisions in those cases. Our goal was to administer the 
survey at a point in which it might be plausible to a member of the 
public that the Court had reached (and was prepared to release the 
results of) its decision but before any media coverage concerning an 
actual, real-world release of the Court’s opinions. 
We exposed panelists to one of three vignettes (dividing our total 
survey sample into three separate groups). Each vignette was written 
in the style of a newspaper story reporting on a Supreme Court 
decision legalizing same-sex marriage. The vignettes were presented 
in a font resembling newspaper formatting.165 
The first vignette provided information suggesting that the 
Court’s decision had been based upon equality concerns. The second 
provided information suggesting that the Court’s decision had been 
based upon liberty concerns. The third vignette was meant to provide 
a “neutral” stimulus—reporting a same-sex marriage endorsement 
from the Supreme Court without providing a description of the 
reasoning behind the Court’s decision. 
The headlines of the “Liberty” and “Equality” vignettes 
explicitly referenced the rationale for the Supreme Court’s reported 
 
 160. Updated: Change in Internet Access by Age Group, 2000–2010, PEW INTERNET & 
AM. LIFE PROJECT (Sept. 10, 2010), http://www.pewinternet.org/Infographics/
2010/Internet-acess-by-age-group-over-time-Update.aspx. 
 161. One can join SSI’s panel by visiting the site https://www.opinionworld.com/. A 
person without internet access, obviously, would not be able to do so. 
 162. None chose to do so. 
 163. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
 164. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013). 
 165. See Zink et al., supra note 7, at 913. 
CITE AS 93 N.C. L. REV. 303 (2015) 
2015] PUBLIC VIEWS OF JUDICIAL REASONING 335 
decision. In addition, all three vignettes included a block or pull 
quote, located in a separate box, which reported to excerpt the 
Supreme Court’s decision. 
Prior to reading the vignette, we asked respondents to answer 
three sets of questions. The first set of questions, adapted and 
updated from the survey used by Fontana and Braman, involved 
knowledge of current political events and individuals. The second set 
of questions asked respondents about their views on same-sex 
marriage.166 The third set of questions asked respondents how 
important the issue of same-sex marriage was to them personally and 
how closely they followed the issue. After completing these 
preliminary questions, respondents were presented with one of the 
three vignettes. The survey vignettes appear in Appendix One. 
After reading the vignettes, we asked panelists to answer two 
sets of questions. The first set of post-stimulus questions asked them 
to provide information about the story that they had read, and the 
second set of post-stimulus questions asked them to provide their 
reaction to the stories. We included the first set of questions in an 
attempt to assess panelist comprehension of the stimulus they had 
been provided. One possible concern in survey research is that any 
statistical results obtained might reflect panelists being confused or 
not understanding what they had just read. By asking them to answer 
questions about the vignette, we aimed to be able to analyze whether 
the effects of each stimulus differed depending on reader 
comprehension. 
In this comprehension module, we asked five True/False 
questions. The first two questions dealt with the Court’s ruling, and 
the second two dealt with its reasoning. In the first two questions, we 
asked if the Court’s decision requires governments to allow same-sex 
marriage or leaves the question to the states. In the third and fourth 
questions, we asked if the reason for the Court’s decision was 
equality-based or liberty-based. In the fifth question, we asked 
whether the Court had provided any reason for its decision.167 
The second set of post-stimulus questions represents our primary 
dependent variables. We asked panelists, following Zink and his 
 
 166. Although Fontana & Braman included questions asking respondents to provide 
their views on what the Constitution says about same-sex marriage, Fontana & Braman, 
Judicial Backlash, supra note 36, at 795, we omitted those questions to avoid mixing 
questions involving panelist opinions about same-sex marriage and questions about 
panelist views on the meaning of the Constitution. 
 167. An entirely “correct” set of answers for a panelist receiving the equality stimulus 
would be true/false/true/false/false. 
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colleagues, to provide us with an opinion, first, on whether they agree 
with the Court’s decision and, second, on whether they accept the 
Court’s decision.168 We included a third question on the panelists’ 
support for an amendment to the U.S. Constitution which would 
prohibit same-sex marriage. 
In both our prestimulus questions on panelist attitudes towards 
same-sex marriage and our post-stimulus questions seeking reaction 
to the reported Court decision, we use a four-point Likert response 
scale: strongly disagree, disagree, agree, and strongly agree.169 While 
Zink and his colleagues use a five-point response scale for their 
“agreement” dependent variables and a four-point response scale for 
“acceptance,”170 we utilize the four-point scale throughout. We 
declined to use the neutral response for two reasons: (1) The neutral 
response, if coded as “3” on a five-point scale, has the “effect of 
pulling the item means to the middle of the scale” and “causes items 
on a survey to look more similar”;171 and (2) not including the neutral 
response forces respondents to make a choice, even if it involves 
expressing a weak opinion. 
Other questions involved true/false responses, or, in the case of 
the political awareness module, choices reflecting the specific items. 
We included a free-form space for panelists to explain why they 
reacted to the Court decision in the way they did to facilitate 
subsequent qualitative analysis. After providing their free-form 
response, panelists were informed that the vignettes they had just 
read were fictional in nature (though drawn from issues currently 
being litigated in the courts). Finally, we included in matrix form ten 
other questions on various issues. 
We subjected the results of our study to an ordered logit 
regression, utilizing the various reaction questions as dependent 
variables and utilizing the prestimulus attitude questions and the 
selected stimulus as our primary independent variables. The ordered 
logit model is appropriate where ordinal responses are analyzed, but 
there is no reason to suppose that the distance between two responses 
 
 168. Zink et al., supra note 7, at 913. 
 169. Fontana & Braman use a six-point scale in the “Policy Preference Module,” which 
includes “slight agree” and “moderately agree,” see Fontana & Braman, Judicial Backlash, 
supra note 36, at 796, a four-factor scale in their “Salience Module,” id. at 795, and a six-
point measure for their “Institutional Preference” dependent variable module, see id. at 
796. To facilitate consistency, we employ the four-response scale throughout. 
 170. Zink et al., supra note 7, at 913. 
 171. What Is the Right Scale for Agree-Disagree Items on a Survey?, MANAGING WITH 
MEASURES BLOG (Feb. 28, 2011, 4:01 PM), http://www.managingwithmeasures.com/what-
is-the-right-scale-for-agree-disagree-items-on-a-survey/. 
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remains constant along a scale.172 In other words, if one cannot say for 
certain that the difference in preference between “strongly disagree” 
and “disagree” is the equivalent of the difference between “strongly 
agree” and “agree,” then an ordered logit approach is proper. 
We created dummy variables for each stimulus, coded as “1” if 
the person was presented with a particular stimulus (LIBERTY, 
EQUALITY, or the NEUTRAL option). Since the independent 
prestimulus attitude variables were also ordinal in nature, we 
followed the accepted practice of creating dummy variables for each 
response option, coded as “1” if the respondent selected that option 
and 0 otherwise. Our regression models omit the “disagree” dummy 
variable, which serves as a reference for interpretation of the 
“strongly disagree,” “agree,” and “strongly agree” coefficients. 
The regression model for the first cut, where the dependent 
variable, Y, would reflect agreement with the Court’s decision, 
willingness to accept the Court’s decision, or support for a 
constitutional amendment to prohibit same-sex marriage, would be: 
 
Y  = α + β1EQUALITY STIMULUS 
+ β2LIBERTY STIMULUS 
+ [βmSSM POLICY PREFERENCE 
DUMMY VARIABLES] 
+ [βnSSM SALIENCE DUMMY 
VARIABLES] 
+ AGE 
 
In this model, by omitting the dummy variable for the 
NEUTRAL stimulus, the coefficients on the LIBERTY and 
EQUALITY stimulus dummies become measures of the impact of 
reading each of those stories, with the NEUTRAL stimulus serving as 
referent. That is, the coefficient we obtain on the LIBERTY 
STIMULUS dummy would tell us, by comparison to those receiving 
the NEUTRAL STIMULUS, what impact the LIBERTY 
STIMULUS had on agreement, acceptance, and support for a 
constitutional amendment to undo the supposed Supreme Court 
decision. By including both the LIBERTY STIMULUS and 
 
 172. Robert K. Fleck & F. Andrew Hanssen, When Voice Fails: Potential Exit As a 
Constraint on Government Quality, 35 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 1, 32 n.42 (2013). 
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EQUALITY STIMULUS dummy variables in our regression 
specification we measure the effect of each stimulus, in comparison to 
the other, and by reference to the NEUTRAL STIMULUS. 
The null hypothesis, H0, would be 
β1 = β2 = 0. 
That is, the null hypothesis would be that it should not matter in 
determining reactions which stimulus was presented to a subject; 
instead, a person’s reaction should be entirely determined by her 
prior views about the issue. 
IV.  RESULTS 
A. Initial Results 
The first model specification uses the question of agreement as 
the dependent variable: 
 
Overall, I agree with the Supreme Court’s decision in this case.173 
 
Subjects responded along a four-point Likert scale (strongly 
disagree, disagree, agree, strongly agree). Numerically, these were 
coded with the numbers 1–4, so a higher number would reflect a more 
positive level of “agreement.” 
Table 2 reveals that there was no statistically significant 
difference among the three subject groups in regard to agreement 
with the Court’s decision based on which article they read. The 
coefficients on both the LIBERTY and the EQUALITY variables 
did not differ from zero at the .05-level of significance. Instead, the 
respondents’ level of agreement with the Court’s decision was largely 
shaped by their prior views. With a pseudo-R-squared value of .27, a 
fairly high level of the variation in respondents’ answers to the 
“agreement” question was explained by their prior views and age.174 
 
 173. This represents a slight rephrasing of a dependent variable used in the Zink study. 
See Zink et al., supra note 7, at 913. 
 174. A pseudo-R-squared of between .2 and .4 is considered “highly satisfactory.” 
Andrew Ainsworth, Logistic Regression, Presentation at California State University at 
Northridge, available at https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source= 
web&cd=1&cad=rja&ved=0CCwQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.csun.edu%2F~ata
20315%2Fpsy524%2Fdocs%2FPsy524%2520lecture%252019%2520logistic_cont.ppt&ei=
r7vFUuK9N4mMyQG-w4HYDg&usg=AFQjCNEYCv3Basg6ywl0R9CBv7MRhIEMiA& 
sig2=gkBMwAo72Gs-JF1rwrNlfQ&bvm=bv.58187178,d.aWc. 
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We obtain statistically significant and predictable results in 
regard to the three “prior view” questions included in this 
regression.175 The questions asking respondents to indicate how 
closely they follow the issue of same-sex marriage and how important 
 
 175. First, subjects were asked to give their level of agreement (again, using a four-
point scale) to the following statement: Permitting gays and lesbians to marry will allow 
more Americans to enter into and benefit from loving and committed relationships. This 
variable was used in the Fontana & Braman study. Fontana & Braman, Judicial Backlash, 
supra note 36, at 70. A subject with a pro-same-sex marriage view would answer “agree” 
or “strongly agree,” while a subject with an anti-same-sex marriage view would answer 
“strongly disagree” or “disagree.” One would expect the sign on the coefficient on 
“disagree” dummies to be negative (disagreeing that same-sex marriage is beneficial 
would likely be correlated with a more negative reaction to the Court’s decision), and the 
coefficient on “agree” dummies to be positive. 
  As Table 2 reveals, the coefficients on all three dummy variables for the “loving 
and committed relationships” statement included in this specification were statistically 
significant at the .05-level (the “disagree” response becomes the reference point through 
exclusion from the specification). 
  The second prior-view question asked respondents to give their level of 
agreement (again, using a four-point scale) to the following statement: Allowing gays and 
lesbians to marry will undermine traditional marriage and American families. Again, this 
variable is derived from the Fontana & Braman study. Fontana & Braman, Judicial 
Backlash, supra note 36, at 70. 
  A pro-same-sex marriage respondent would be expected to disagree with this 
statement, while an anti-same-sex marriage respondent would be expected to agree with 
this statement. Here, we obtain statistical significance on the two “agree” dummy 
variables and the sign is, as one would expect, negative (agreeing that same-sex marriage 
would undermine traditional marriage would be expected to correlate with disagreement 
with a Court decision legalizing same-sex marriage). 
  By contrast, the coefficient on the dummy for a “strongly disagree” response is 
not statistically significant. This could be interpreted to mean that it does not matter 
whether a respondent “disagrees” or “strongly disagrees” on the “undermine marriage” 
statement, since the omitted “disagree” response serves here as the referent. 
  Our third prior-view question asked for respondents to indicate their level of 
agreement with the following statement: Marriage should be defined as the union of one 
man and one woman. We omitted this question from our regression models to avoid 
multicollinearity. Tests for multicollinearity are available upon request. 
  Our fourth prior-view question asked respondents to give their level of agreement 
(again, using a four-point scale) to the following statement: Gay and lesbian couples 
should be allowed to marry in the same manner as heterosexual couples. 
  Again, since we use “disagree” as the referent, we would expect positive 
coefficients on the “agree” and “strongly agree” response dummy variables, and a 
negative coefficient on the “strongly disagree” dummy variable. As expected, the signs on 
agree and “strongly agree” dummies are positive (and the coefficients increase), and the 
sign on “strongly disagree” is negative; the coefficients are also statistically significant at 
the .05 level. The more a person agrees that gay couples should be permitted to marry, the 
more positive her response is to a Court decision requiring states and the federal 
government to allow same-sex marriage. 
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it is to them personally did not yield statistically significant 
variables.176 
 
Table 2: Agreement with Court’s Decision 
VARIABLE    OLOGIT 
      
Coefficient  P-value 
Stimulus 
Equality Dummy   -.02   .86 
Liberty Dummy    -.12   .35 
SSM Prior View 
SSM=loving and committed 
 Strongly Disagree Dummy -.64*   .00 
 Agree Dummy    .51*   .00 
 Strongly Agree Dummy  1.1*  .00 
SSM=undermine traditional  
Strongly Disagree Dummy  .13   .48 
 Agree Dummy   -.49*  .00 
 Strongly Agree Dummy -.92*  .00 
SSM should be permitted 
Strongly Disagree Dummy -1.2*  .00 
 Agree Dummy     .97*  .00 
 Strongly Agree Dummy  1.9*  .00 
SSM Salience 
Important to me personally 
Strongly Disagree Dummy -.02   .89 
 Agree Dummy     .05  .71 
 Strongly Agree Dummy  .13   .53 
Closely follow SSM issue 
Strongly Disagree Dummy  .04   .82 
 Agree Dummy    -.01   .93  
 Strongly Agree Dummy  .14   .50 
Age 
Age     -.00  .15 
 
Number of Observations   1502 
Log Likelihood    -1414 
Pseudo R-squared    .27 
LR chi2     1038 
* p < .05; two-tailed test   
 
 176. Similarly, in this model we did not find that age had a statistically significant effect 
on agreement with the Court’s decision, controlling for the “prior view” variables. 
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Our second model specification uses the question of acceptance 
as the dependent variable: 
 
I accept the Supreme Court’s decision. That is, I think that the 
decision ought to be accepted and considered to be the final word on 
the matter. I do not think that there ought to be an effort to challenge 
the decision and get it changed.177 
 
Here, as indicated in Table 3, we obtain what at first blush 
appear to be the most striking results associated with our study. We 
find a statistically significant negative coefficient on the dummy 
variable for the EQUALITY STIMULUS. That is, reading the 
equality stimulus (unlike the liberty stimulus) with the “neutral” 
stimulus as a reference point makes respondents less likely to indicate 
acceptance of the Court’s decision.178 
Although the coefficient on this variable is statistically 
significant, its magnitude arguably is not.179 When we calculate the 
“Odds Ratio” for this variable, we get a ratio of .74, suggesting that a 
change in whether or not a party read the EQUALITY STIMULUS 
has only approximately a one in four chance of changing the reader’s 
response in terms of acceptance.180 Nevertheless, the results on 
acceptance, while perhaps anomalous, merit further discussion, in 
which we engage below. 
 
 177. This is a slight rephrasing of a variable described as “the most commonly used 
measure in the literature.” See Zink et al., supra note 7, at 913 (citing James L. Gibson, 
Gregory A. Caldeira & Lester Kenyatta Spence, Why Do People Accept Public Policies 
They Oppose? Testing Legitimacy Theory with a Survey-Based Experiment, 58 POL. RES. 
Q. 187, 190–91 (2005)). 
 178. Dropping the subjects viewing the “neutral” stimulus from the pool, we do not 
find a statistically significant difference in regard to either acceptance or agreement with 
the Court’s decision based on viewing the equality, rather than the liberty stimulus. That 
is, while there is a negative effect of EQUALITY on acceptance in the primary 
regressions, and no effect of LIBERTY, a comparison of only LIBERTY and 
EQUALITY does not produce a statistically significant difference. Full regressions are 
available from authors upon request. 
 179. The -.30 coefficient suggests that, for subjects reading the EQUALITY 
STIMULUS, controlling for other variables, they would move less than a third of the way 
towards a “lower” level of agreement (that is, less than a third of a way from, say, 
“strongly agree” to “agree”). The 95% confidence interval for this coefficient is between -
.54 and -.06, suggesting that it is possible that the actual effect of reading the EQUALITY 
STIMULUS may be even lower. 
 180. Odds-ratio calculations are available from the authors upon request. 
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The coefficient on the LIBERTY STIMULUS, by comparison, is 
not statistically significant at the .05 level.181 
As reflected in Table 3, we continue to observe statistically 
significant coefficients (with predictable signs) on the “prior views” 
questions concerning whether to permit same-sex marriage and 
whether permitting same-sex marriage would expand the number of 
persons in loving and committed relationships.182 
 
Table 3: Accept Court’s Decision 
 
VARIABLE    OLOGIT 
      
Coefficient  P-value 
Stimulus 
Equality Dummy   -.29*   .01 
Liberty Dummy    -.19   .12 
 
SSM Prior View 
SSM=loving and committed 
 Strongly Disagree Dummy -.44*   .02 
 Agree Dummy     .39*   .02 
 Strongly Agree Dummy  .87*  .00 
SSM=undermine traditional  
Strongly Disagree Dummy  .28   .12 
 Agree Dummy   -.12  .44 
 Strongly Agree Dummy -.65*  .00 
SSM should be permitted 
Strongly Disagree Dummy -1.1*  .00 
 Agree Dummy     .83*  .00 
 Strongly Agree Dummy  1.4*  .00 
 
  
 
 181. Similarly, if we drop the subjects receiving the EQUALITY STIMULUS from our 
model and compare only the subjects receiving the LIBERTY STIMULUS to those 
receiving the NEUTRAL STIMULUS, we get a positive but not statistically significant 
coefficient on the LIBERTY STIMULUS dummy. Full regressions are available from 
authors upon request. In other words, compared to the NEUTRAL STIMULUS, the 
LIBERTY STIMULUS dummy appears to have no discernible impact on subject 
acceptance. 
 182. Similarly, we continue to find mixed results for the question relating to whether 
permitting same-sex marriage would undermine traditional families. 
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SSM Salience 
Important to me personally 
Strongly Disagree Dummy  .21   .16 
 Agree Dummy     -.02  .89 
 Strongly Agree Dummy  .32   .11 
Closely follow SSM issue 
Strongly Disagree Dummy -.05   .76 
 Agree Dummy    -.08   .55  
 Strongly Agree Dummy  .48*   .02 
 
Age 
Age     -.00  .22 
 
Number of Observations   1502 
Log Likelihood    -1575 
Pseudo R-squared    .19 
LR chi2     742 
 
* p < .05; two-tailed test  
 
  
Our third model specification uses the question of support for a 
constitutional amendment as the dependent variable. Respondents 
were asked for their level of agreement with the following statement: 
 
I support an amendment to the United States Constitution that 
would prohibit same-sex couples from marrying. 
 
The results of the regressions for amendment support are 
reported in Table 4. Neither the EQUALITY nor the LIBERTY 
treatments had a statistically significant effect on respondents’ 
support for a constitutional amendment.183 
  
 
 183. Interestingly, in this specification, for the first time, all of the response dummies 
for the question relating to whether legalizing same-sex marriage would undermine 
traditional marriage were statistically significant. Similarly, for the first time we find 
statistically significant effects for those who “strongly agree” that they closely follow the 
issue and that it is important to them personally—with strong followers and those feeling 
the issue is personally important statistically more likely to support a constitutional 
amendment. We also, for the first time, find that age has a statistically significant (though 
low magnitude) effect on our dependent variable—the older the person, the lower his 
support for a constitutional amendment banning same-sex marriage (again, though, the 
coefficient is quite small). 
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Table 4: Support for Constitutional Amendment Banning SSM 
 
VARIABLE    OLOGIT 
      
Coefficient  P-value 
Stimulus 
Equality Dummy   -.00   .96 
Liberty Dummy    -.11   .39 
 
SSM Prior View 
SSM=loving and committed 
 Strongly Disagree Dummy  .48*   .02 
 Agree Dummy     -.18   .29 
 Strongly Agree Dummy  -.43  .07 
SSM=undermine traditional  
Strongly Disagree Dummy -1.6*   .00 
 Agree Dummy    .85*  .00 
 Strongly Agree Dummy 1.44*  .00 
SSM should be permitted 
Strongly Disagree Dummy  1.2*  .00 
 Agree Dummy     -.49*  .00 
 Strongly Agree Dummy  -1.71.9* .00 
 
SSM Salience 
Important to me personally 
Strongly Disagree Dummy -.02   .87 
 Agree Dummy     .95  .52 
 Strongly Agree Dummy  .54*   .01 
Closely follow SSM issue 
Strongly Disagree Dummy  .23   .18 
 Agree Dummy     .15   .26  
 Strongly Agree Dummy  .71*   .00 
 
Age 
Age     -.01*  .00 
 
Number of Observations   1502 
Log Likelihood    -1443 
Pseudo R-squared    .29 
LR chi2     1208 
 
* p < .05; two-tailed test  
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B. Extension: Subject Comprehension 
After obtaining the preliminary results discussed above, we next 
attempted to determine whether panelists’ comprehension of the 
vignettes they encountered affected their reactions to those decisions. 
Unfortunately, we found that our respondents, at a very high rate, 
answered “True” both when asked if the Court used a liberty 
rationale and when asked if the Court used an equality rationale.184 
For instance, of our 500 subjects reading the EQUALITY 
STIMULUS, 378 answered “True” both when asked whether the 
reason for the Court’s decision was equality-based and liberty-based. 
For the 500 subjects reading the LIBERTY STIMULUS, 409 
answered “True” both when asked if the reason for the Court’s 
decision was equality-based and liberty-based. Among respondents 
exposed to the NEUTRAL STIMULUS (with no mention of the 
Court’s reasoning), 371 answered “True” when asked whether the 
Court had used both equality-based and liberty-based rationales. 
Given these results, we constructed a new set of variables to 
reflect panelist comprehension without requiring an “entirely correct” 
response.185 This allows the reapplication of the regression models to 
a smaller sample with only those answering “correctly” being 
included. With N=322 for that population, we end up with coefficients 
on the EQUALITY and LIBERTY STIMULUS dummy variables in 
an ordered logit regression that are not statistically significant.186 
Instead, then, we constructed a new regression model in which 
we exploited the information generated regarding whether panelists 
 
 184. In retrospect, it would have been better to present the Comprehension module as 
a single question, from which respondents selected a single “right” answer, rather than as 
three separate “True/False” questions. It is also possible that our efforts to describe in 
understandable yet specific terms whether the reasoning was based on equality or liberty 
remained confusing for panelists. While we labored to construct clear questions in this 
area, we may not have gotten to the point we had hoped. 
 185. For those receiving the LIBERTY STIMULUS, we treated their comprehension 
response as “correct” if they: (1) correctly responded that the Court’s decision requires 
governments to allow same-sex marriage and does not leave the question open to the 
states; (2) answered “True” when asked whether the Court used a liberty-based rationale; 
and (3) answered “False” to the question of whether the story omitted any discussion of 
the Court’s explanation. Similarly, for those receiving the EQUALITY STIMULUS, we 
treated as “correct” accurate answers to the two questions relating to the impact of the 
Court’s decision, and a “True” response to the question regarding whether the rationale 
was equality-based accompanied by a “False” response to the no-rationale question. In 
other words, we counted as “correct” a portion of responses that answered “True” to both 
our LIBERTY and EQUALITY comprehension question, so long as they did not also 
answer “True” to our no-rationale question. 
 186. The full results from this regression are available from the authors upon request. 
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answered correctly but did not excise 75% of our study subjects.187 
This model attempts to take into account whether subjects 
demonstrated a relatively higher level of understanding and 
comprehension of the vignettes with which they were presented. We 
created a new dummy variable coded as “1” for a “correct” response 
(as described above) and zero otherwise. We then added that dummy 
variable to ordered logit regressions. Here, for the specification using 
the most interesting of our dependent variables, “acceptance,” we 
found that having a “correct” understanding of the vignettes 
presented was associated with a more positive level of “acceptance.” 
The coefficient on the new “correct” variable is .28, with a p-value of 
.022.188 
On the other hand, we found a statistically significant negative 
coefficient on the EQUALITY STIMULUS, and a negative and 
nearly significant coefficient on the LIBERTY STIMULUS dummy 
variable.189 In other words, we can say that, by controlling for subject 
understanding of the vignettes, both the EQUALITY STIMULUS 
and the LIBERTY STIMULUS have negative effects on panelist 
acceptance when compared to the NEUTRAL STIMULUS. To be 
clear, what these results do not suggest is that those who best 
understood our instrument had more negative responses when seeing 
one of the two stimuli that contained an explanation of the Court’s 
reasoning. This specification tests the effect of the LIBERTY and 
EQUALITY STIMULI taking into account the level of panelist 
comprehension. In fact, the positive and statistically significant 
coefficient on the “correctness” measure, read in light of the negative 
coefficients on both reasoning stimulus variables, suggests the 
following: (1) understanding was associated with a higher level of 
acceptance; and (2) the negative effects of being presented with 
“reasoning” explanations may be concentrated among those who 
demonstrated a relatively low level of understanding of the reasoning 
in the Court’s supposed decision. 
To extend this inquiry, we developed an additional regression 
model that utilized interaction terms connecting the “correctness” 
and “stimulus” variables. The coefficient on the term interacting the 
 
 187. Our subjects demonstrated what appears to be a low level of comprehension, or at 
least they were unable to evidence that comprehension in their survey responses; yet their 
responses did appear to be influenced by the nature of the stimulus they had been 
administered. 
 188. Full regression results are available from the authors upon request. 
 189. We find statistically significant negative coefficients on both terms in the ordered 
logit specification. 
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LIBERTY or EQUALITY STIMULUS dummy with the 
comprehension dummy would isolate the effect of reading either 
stimulus (as opposed to the NEUTRAL STIMULUS) for those with 
a high level of comprehension from the effects of reading each 
stimulus generally. For the coefficients on both interaction terms, we 
get positive signs, just outside of the range of statistical significance at 
the .05-level.190 The coefficients on the EQUALITY and LIBERTY 
dummies remain negative and statistically significant. This suggests 
that for those who understood the vignettes, explanations of either 
liberty or equality grounds enhanced acceptance when compared to 
the no-explanation rationale. On the other hand, for those with a 
lower level of understanding of the vignettes, either rationale 
continued to exert a negative effect on acceptance. 
C. Extension: Limiting Analysis to Those with Strong Positive 
Reactions to the Court’s Decision 
Our study aimed to explore backlash, but our survey only seeks 
to obtain information about subjects’ immediate reactions and 
responses to the vignettes to which they were exposed. In the real 
world, backlash is a more complicated phenomenon. For backlash to 
a Supreme Court decision to arise, there would likely need to be some 
mobilization of popular objections by elites and other policy 
entrepreneurs.191 Our study cannot answer the question of when a 
Court decision is likely to trigger backlash in that it does not include 
any other mediating influences besides a simulated newspaper report 
discussing the Court’s decision. 
That said, it is logical to posit that elites can only mobilize a 
backlash against a decision where the public does not strongly 
support or accept that decision. Therefore, we construct an additional 
regression model in which we limit our analysis to those respondents 
who “strongly agreed” or “strongly accepted” the Court’s decision. 
Here, we posit that such individuals could not be mobilized by elites 
to form part of a backlash. To the extent that the Court’s reasoning 
affects the proportion of respondents “strongly agreeing” with the 
decision or who “strongly agree” that they accept the decision, it 
would be far more difficult for elites to mobilize a backlash. 
Arguably, even respondents who “agreed” with a decision could, 
 
 190. Regression results are available from the authors upon request. 
 191. Egan & Citrin, supra note 112, at 5 (“[I]n reality a Supreme Court ruling is just the 
opening salvo of a debate among the nation’s elites that can quickly overwhelm any of the 
persuasive power of the ruling in a case.”). 
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under the right circumstances, be convinced by elites that the decision 
was objectionable and could thus become part of a backlash. 
To construct this next set of regressions, we create dummy 
variables coded as “1” if a respondent strongly agrees with the 
Court’s decision or strongly agrees with the statement that she 
accepts the Court’s decision. Since this limited dependent variable is 
not an ordinal one, we use a logit rather than ordered logit approach. 
The results confirmed the earlier regression model.192 There is no 
statistically significant effect in terms of the level of strong agreement 
with the Court’s decision based on which stimulus respondents 
viewed, controlling for age, prior views on the issue and salience.193 
However, there is a statistically significant negative effect on 
acceptance based on viewing the equality-based stimulus. This could 
be read to suggest that a Court decision using an equality rationale 
will produce a smaller share of the public that strongly accepts the 
decision and which would be predisposed in a manner inconsistent 
with mobilization for backlash. But with little effect on strong 
agreement with the decision, it is hard to conclude that overall an 
equality rationale does not do as good a job as a liberty rationale or 
no rationale at all in containing backlash by minimizing the pool of 
people receptive to mobilization by elites against the Court’s decision. 
V.  DISCUSSION 
Our study tested Yoshino’s theory that Supreme Court reasoning 
in decisions vindicating civil rights in high-salience contexts—like 
same-sex marriage—can affect the public’s reception of those 
decisions. For reasons set forth more fully below, we remain 
unconvinced that the Court’s reasoning matters to the people. While 
our results do intriguingly suggest that any reasoning might negatively 
affect the public’s reception of certain decisions, they do not 
overwhelmingly support the proposition that a particular kind of 
reasoning will dampen any pluralism anxiety that the public is likely 
to exhibit in response to those decisions. 
Before our study, our intuition was that reasoning was not as 
significant a determinant of public reception of certain decisions as 
were other factors, including cultural priors with respect to high-
salience issues like same-sex marriage. After our study—with some 
 
 192. Full results are available from the authors upon request. 
 193. The coefficient on the EQUALITY STIMULUS here was negative, with a p-
value of .052, which is just outside of the range of statistical significance. 
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important limitations which are discussed here—our intuition remains 
the same. 
A. Differences Between Liberty and Equality Do Not (Really) 
Resonate with the People 
Our hypothesis was that judicial reasoning is simply too granular 
and nuanced to affect public reaction to judicial decisions in culturally 
contested cases such as same-sex marriage. The results of our study 
overwhelmingly confirm our preliminary intuition. Whether subjects 
agree or disagree with a Court opinion, and whether they support a 
constitutional amendment to prohibit same-sex marriage, appear to 
be determined not by the reasoning employed by the Court but 
instead by the subjects’ prior views of the issue. 
To be sure, we did find limited evidence that where the Supreme 
Court employs equality-based reasoning in legalizing same-sex 
marriage, the public’s “acceptance” of the Court’s decision is 
reduced.194 These results conflict with those of past experiments 
connecting public acceptance and Court decisions. In those 
experiments, researchers found little relationship between the basis 
for a Court decision and public acquiescence.195 That said, the 
magnitude of the effect we observe is relatively small, and thus, even 
though we are somewhat intrigued by the results of our study, we are 
unable to conclude that, broadly speaking, an equality-based 
rationale produces a different response in terms of public support for 
an opinion. 
Figures 1, 2, and 3 display our results visually, by focusing on 
respondents’ prestimulus response to the question of whether gay and 
lesbian couples should be permitted to marry in the same fashion as 
heterosexual couples (the most robustly predictive of our “prior 
views” dependent variables). Dividing survey respondents according 
to their level of agreement with that statement (on a four-point scale) 
and the stimulus to which they were exposed produces a 4 X 3 
between-subjects design. Figure 2 may overstate the effect of 
 
 194. It bears mentioning that while we find that equality rationales have a slight 
negative effect on acceptance, we do not observe a greater level of support for a 
constitutional amendment based on exposure to an equality rationale. The respondents 
are simultaneously reporting that they are less likely to accept the Court’s equality-based 
decision as the final word on the matter, but are no more likely to want to amend the 
Constitution. It may be that the public views constitutional amendments as a particularly 
harsh response. Instead of an amendment overturning a Court decision, those less inclined 
to accept the decision may prefer that legislation or a subsequent Court decision weaken a 
same-sex marriage precedent at the margins. 
 195. Gibson et al., supra note 177, at 192. 
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accept a Supreme Court decision vindicating marriage equality for 
same-sex couples.197 Still, the magnitude of the effect appears to be 
small, and weighed alongside the lack of any observable difference in 
“agreement” with a decision, or support for an amendment to 
overturn a decision, we are unwilling to conclude at this point that our 
study suggests a clear influence of judicial reasoning on public 
reception. Given that reading the equality stimulus had only around a 
one in four chance of changing a respondent’s answer on 
“acceptance” and no effect on a respondent’s “agreement” or support 
for a constitutional amendment overturning the Court’s decision, we 
are unable to conclude that judicial reasoning, as a positive matter, is 
decisive in shaping public reactions. 
Interestingly, while our results do not provide strong support for 
the proposition that equality is that much worse than liberty in terms 
of losing public acceptance of a Supreme Court opinion vindicating 
marriage for same-sex couples, they do provide support for the 
proposition that any reasoning tends to be worse than no reasoning at 
all. That is, when controlling for subjects’ comprehension, we see a 
negative effect of both the liberty rationale and the equality rationale 
when compared to the neutral rationale.198 This is intriguing. It could 
be that the public does not understand that justifying decisions is 
commonplace—and required, of course, by principles of sound 
jurisprudence.199 Perhaps the public presumes that a decision that 
does not need to be justified is most in line with governing law and 
authority. This may be especially pronounced for those subjects that 
are confused about the questions/stimuli. When low-comprehension 
 
 197. In this sense, our results stand apart from previous work, which has found a 
stronger relationship between signals from the Court and public agreement than between 
such signals and public acceptance. See Zink et al., supra note 7, at 922. Our study finds 
the opposite in the case of Court signals relating to the reasons for decisions––those 
articulated reasons have a greater effect in our study on acceptance than on agreement. 
See supra tbls. 2–4. Perhaps there is something special about same-sex marriage. Or 
perhaps there is something distinguishing our treatment (the Court’s reasoning) from the 
treatment employed in prior research (such as whether the decision overrules precedent 
and is unanimous). 
 198. The negative effect of the liberty rationale, while not statistically significant at the 
.05-level, was statistically significant at the more generous .10-level. 
 199. See Liza Vertinsky, Comparing Alternative Institutional Paths to Patent Reform, 61 
ALA. L. REV. 501, 532 (2010) (“Courts must give reasons for their decisions, and their 
decisions must reasonably relate to the specific case they are deciding.”). That the public 
does not believe that this is so is supported by public opinion research, which has found 
that a near majority (47%) of the public either believes that the Court does not regularly 
give reasons for its rulings (18%) or does not know (29%). See Michael Serota, Popular 
Constitutional Interpretation, 44 CONN. L. REV. 1637, 1659 (2012). 
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subjects—the vast majority of subjects in our study—encounter any 
rationale, they may be less likely to accept the decision.200 
Alternatively, it could be that the negative effects of equality and 
liberty vis-à-vis no rationale in our study was the result of implicit bias 
against same-sex marriage, sexual minorities, or both. That is, it could 
be that subjects were less likely to accept a Supreme Court decision 
that vindicated marriage equality on the basis of a rationale rather 
than no rationale because the vignettes presenting a rationale 
(whether liberty or equality) contained more reasoning than the 
neutral stimulus. More reasoning, in turn, involves more language 
about things like “same-sex marriage” and “gays/lesbians”—language 
that could conceivably trigger subjects’ implicit bias against same-sex 
marriage and/or sexual minorities. 
More specifically, hundreds of validated studies have shown that 
implicit bias against gay people not only exists, but also influences 
biased individuals’ treatment of them.201 Even people who explicitly 
support gay rights exhibit implicit bias against gay people.202 
Moreover, one of the tests used by social scientists to measure 
implicit bias against sexual minorities, the Implicit Association Test, 
uses words like “gay” and “lesbian” to trigger unconscious bias.203 
It could be, then, that the more the Court in our vignettes 
reasoned about same-sex marriage—and, in particular, about the 
rights of “gays” and “lesbians” to marriage—the more our subjects’ 
implicit biases were triggered. The negative effects of both liberty and 
equality relative to no rationale—as well as the slightly more negative 
effect of equality, whose vignette drew attention to “gays” and 
“lesbians”—might therefore be capturing that implicit bias.204 While 
 
 200. Future work could explore this possibility by inserting an additional stimulus 
involving an implausible line of reasoning (e.g., justifying a same-sex marriage decision by 
reference to the bankruptcy code). 
 201. See Kang, Implicit Bias, supra note 88, at 1170. 
 202. See Yoel Inbar et al., Disgust Sensitivity Predicts Intuitive Disapproval of Gays, 9 
EMOTION 435, 438 (2009). 
 203. For a description of the Implicit Association Test, see Anthony G. Greenwald et 
al., Measuring Individual Differences in Implicit Cognition: The Implicit Association Test, 
74 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1464, 1464–66 (1998) (introducing and describing 
the Implicit Association Test (“IAT”)); see also Brian A. Nosek, Anthony G. Greenwald 
& Mahzarin R. Banaji, The Implicit Association Test at Age 7: A Methodological and 
Conceptual Review, in SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY AND THE UNCONSCIOUS: THE 
AUTOMATICITY OF HIGHER MENTAL PROCESSES 265, 267–71 (John A. Bargh ed., 2007).  
 204. If that is right—that is, if it is true that our findings on the slightly negative effects 
of equality on acceptance are capturing the well-documented phenomenon of implicit bias 
against homosexuality—then what Yoshino calls “pluralism anxiety” might actually be the 
product of an implicit bias against equality-related concepts. 
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subjects may not have understood what they were reading, they 
clearly reacted to it; their reactions, perhaps unconscious, were 
pronounced.205 
In sum, our primary positive reservation with Yoshino’s theory 
was not overcome by our results. We remain unconvinced that it 
matters to the people (in terms of alleviating or curtailing their 
pluralism anxiety) whether the Court rests a marriage-equality 
decision on liberty or on equality. Our findings with respect to the 
equality rationale were simply not strong enough to suggest to us that 
liberty does that much better a job at containing pluralism anxiety—
and perhaps, by extension, backlash—than does equality. 
Importantly, we did find that reasoning generally matters in terms of 
public reception of a hypothetical marriage-equality decision, as our 
subjects exhibited a more negative reaction to vignettes that 
contained some reasoning as opposed to no reasoning at all. An 
explanation for this finding is hard to pinpoint, although one 
possibility is that more reasoning contains more language and that 
there is something about language—and particularly the language 
used in our vignettes—that triggers an intuitive response against 
same-sex marriage generally, and sexual minorities specifically. 
B. Our Study’s Limitations 
Our study, like most empirical and experimental work,206 has 
some limitations. The first and most obvious limitation of our study is 
one that is also reflected in prior work such as that of Professors Zink, 
Braman, and Fontana, namely that backlash involves a complex 
process that cannot be captured through the administration of a single 
survey instrument.207 We accept that our method does not capture the 
nuance that shapes, over a period of months or years, how a Court 
decision may be received by the public.208 Perhaps it is more 
appropriate to say that what we are really capturing—as suggested in 
the previous subpart209—is the implicit or unconscious bias that the 
 
 205. See supra note 190 and accompanying text. 
 206. Fontana & Braman, Judicial Backlash, supra note 36, at 756. 
 207. See Ilya Somin, The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Political Response to Kelo, 
93 MINN. L. REV. 2100, 2159–63 (2012) (describing failure of survey data to accurately 
capture backlash as a phenomenon). 
 208. Among the many factors—aside from Supreme Court reasoning—that might 
generate backlash are: “public opinion on the underlying issue; the relative intensity of 
preference on the two sides of the issue; the degree to which public opinion is divided 
along geographic or regional lines; and the ease with which a particular Court ruling can 
be circumvented or defied.” Klarman, supra note 5, at 148. 
 209. See supra notes 178–81 and accompanying text. 
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public has against particular terms or concepts that appear in 
descriptions of a Court decision. 
Second, our model presumes that the content of Court decisions 
reaches the members of the public, which may not always happen in 
the real world. Our research question was whether the reasoning 
articulated by the Supreme Court could serve to alleviate the people’s 
pluralism anxiety and, by extension, constrain public backlash. For 
the Court’s reasoning to matter in the real world, the following must 
occur: (1) The Court articulates reasons; (2) the public learns of the 
Court’s articulation; and (3) the public understands the Court’s 
articulation. Our survey skips step two in this process, or, to be 
precise, assumes that step two occurs. Our findings cannot measure 
whether the public would be likely to encounter Court reasoning if 
the public does not seek it out; instead, all we can measure is how the 
public responds when it is presented with judicial reasoning. 
Third, our study isolates the Supreme Court’s role from the role 
of other cultural actors that will affect public disposition in the 
aftermath of Court decisions in controversial cases. Whatever the 
Supreme Court might say could, in the real world, be “drowned out 
by the polarizing re-biasing being performed by interested parties in 
these cases.”210 Even the best efforts by the Court to constrain 
backlash through messaging can thus be undermined.211 Our study, of 
course, subjects panelists only to news about a decision and does not 
expose them to the full panoply of voices they would likely encounter 
in the real world. 
Fourth and related, our study is limited in that all subjects 
received word of the Court’s decision in a uniform fashion. In the real 
world, “citizens learn about different Court decisions based on 
information available and salient to them,” which means it may be 
“misguided” to assume “uniform national effects.”212 
Fifth, we tested equality and liberty rationales in isolation, 
whereas Yoshino’s precise argument is not that courts should ignore 
equality in favor of liberty, but instead that courts ought to lead with 
liberty.213 Further work could present vignettes embracing both 
arguments but alter the order of presentation to see if the ordering of 
 
 210. Fontana & Braman, Judicial Backlash, supra note 36, at 773. 
 211. Id. 
 212. HOEKSTRA, supra note 113, at 3. 
 213. See Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, supra note 12, at 747, 802 (Yoshino notes 
that “constitutional equality and liberty claims are often intertwined” as so-called “dignity 
claims” but advocates for “liberty-based dignity jurisprudence [because it] leads with 
[liberty] to quiet pluralism anxiety in an increasingly diverse society”). 
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arguments leads to different reactions. Given low levels of subject 
comprehension in our study, we are skeptical that such an approach 
would produce observable differences. Subjects in our study 
attributed rationales to the Court not included in the vignettes they 
read. There is no reason to believe that members of the public would 
be discerning enough to grasp differences in the order in which 
arguments were presented. 
Sixth and last, our study was limited to the issue of same-sex 
marriage. Yoshino’s theory is not so limited; instead, he argues that 
the “leading with liberty” tactic should be applied in a larger subset of 
cases dealing with the vindication of “civil rights.”214 Future work 
could adopt our methodology to test the impact of judicial reasoning 
on public reactions in a wider variety of scenarios. 
VI.  NORMATIVE CRITIQUE 
As noted in this Article’s introduction, our primary objection to 
Yoshino’s theory is a normative one, and it is to this objection that we 
now turn. Even if Yoshino is descriptively correct that pluralism 
anxiety is alleviated better by liberty than by equality—which we 
seriously doubt for all of the reasons set forth above—we would still 
reject his suggestion that courts downplay the equality demands of 
identity groups in decisions vindicating their civil rights. The results of 
our study, which found scant support for the proposition that equality 
is significantly worse than liberty in terms of cultivating public 
acceptance, simply make a stronger case for why rejecting Yoshino’s 
theory makes sense not just from a normative standpoint (as we 
argue) but from a positive standpoint as well. 
More specifically, we argue that Yoshino’s suggested strategy of 
“leading with liberty” in gay rights cases amounts to judicial 
“covering” of what is really “at stake” in them.215 Liberty, under this 
view, is less antidote and more anodyne. Our critique is limited to an 
examination of the “leading with liberty” idea in the context of gay 
rights specifically—a context that seems especially important to 
 
 214. Id. at 792 (“[W]here a claim can be validly characterized as either a liberty-based 
or an equality-based dignity claim, it should be characterized as the former.”); id. at 793–
97 (discussing his “new equal protection” theory in the context of “civil rights” more 
generally). 
 215. See Heather K. Gerken, Larry and Lawrence, 42 TULSA L. REV. 843, 851 (2007) 
(“[W]hat is really at stake in these debates [over sexual orientation discrimination] is not 
whether all humans should enjoy a right, but whether gays and lesbians, in particular, 
should do so, and that idea is better captured by the equal protection paradigm.”). 
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Yoshino, given his reliance on gay rights and on key gay rights cases 
to articulate his theory.216 
Should the Supreme Court establish a national marriage-equality 
precedent at some point in the near future—as some scholars have 
predicted217—we believe that it ought to resist Yoshino’s suggested 
strategy for two reasons relating to the “covering” idea. The first 
reason, discussed in Subpart A, concerns the relationship between 
liberty rationales and the peculiar rhetorical history that has attended 
the law’s treatment of sexual minorities for decades. The second 
reason, addressed in Subpart B, concerns the relationship between 
liberty rationales and implicit bias against gay people. 
A. Liberty and Sexual Minorities’ Peculiar Rhetorical History 
To borrow an image with which Yoshino is well familiar, we 
believe that leading with liberty in gay rights cases constitutes 
undesirable judicial “covering”218 of what those cases are really about: 
discrimination against gays and lesbians. Consider, for instance, 
Yoshino’s recommendation that courts frame the question of gay 
marriage in liberty terms rather than in equality terms in order to 
make gay marriage more palatable to the general public.219 He asks 
 
 216. Yoshino anticipates four objections to his theory in his Harvard Law Review 
article. One is that we ought to encourage people to overcome their anxieties rather than 
capitulate to them. Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, supra note 12, at 797. A second is 
that “with respect to certain groups, we should be careful about jumping to a higher level 
of generality” through, say, liberty-based rationales. Id. at 798. A third is that “liberty-
based dignity claims allow subordinated groups to contest their subordination only in a 
piecemeal fashion.” Id. at 799. A fourth is that the “liberty-based dignity paradigm . . . is a 
false rescue because it substitutes one slippery-slope claim for another.” Id. More 
specifically, the liberty claim replaces the question of which groups ought to receive 
protection with the question of which rights ought to receive protection. Id. at 800. 
Yoshino responds to each of these objections in turn. Professor Katie Eyer has recently 
articulated a different normative objection to Yoshino’s theory. See Eyer, supra note 148, 
at 6. She argues that “there are strong signs that the [LGB] movement has finally ‘arrived,’ 
rendering it plausible for the first time that the Court may extend full equal protection 
coverage.” Id. Professor Eyer further contends that “there are reasons to believe that 
Yoshino’s suggested focus [on liberty over equality] might actually be counterproductive 
for groups that have reached this equal protection tipping point.” Id. 
 217. Klarman, supra note 5, at 158 (“Within a few years of Windsor, as public support 
for gay marriage continues to increase and as more states enact it into law, one can 
imagine some Justices being tempted to extend that ruling to forbid the states from 
excluding same-sex couples from marriage. Indeed, the Windsor dissents of both Chief 
Justice Roberts and Justice Scalia seem mostly addressed to that eventuality . . . .”). 
 218. YOSHINO, COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT, supra note 48, at ix; Yoshino, 
Covering, supra note 49, at 794.  
 219. Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, supra note 12, at 793. 
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readers to consider how different the following two claims sound “to 
the American ear: 
(1) ‘Gays should have the right to marry because straights have 
the right to marry and gays are equal to straights;’ or 
(2) ‘All adults should have the right to marry the person they 
love.’ ”220 
Echoing a similar argument made by Martha Nussbaum,221 
Yoshino argues that proposition two is more “persuasive” than 
proposition one because 
it performs the empathy it seeks. It frames the right at a high 
enough level of generality that opposite-sex couples are urged 
to imagine a world in which they were denied the right. In 
contrast, equal protection claims tend to stress distinctions 
among us, even as they ask us to overcome those distinctions.222 
Under this view, proposition two is more persuasive than proposition 
one because it downplays an essentializing equality claim in favor of a 
more universalizing liberty claim. 
But proposition two downplays something else that might make 
it more appealing to the public than proposition one: gay and lesbian 
identity. In this particular example, it is not just equality that is elided 
from the liberty statement, it is equality for gays and lesbians 
specifically that is absent. The “gays” of proposition one are collapsed 
into the “all adults” of proposition two. The gay discrimination 
objected to in proposition one becomes the people-who-want-to-
marry discrimination objected to in proposition two. If “covering,” as 
Yoshino elsewhere defines it, means “to tone down a disfavored 
identity to fit into the main stream,”223 then this particular liberty 
frame exemplifies the covering idea. 
Admittedly, there is evidence to support the notion that covering 
or toning down the “gay” aspect of the marriage question might make 
gay marriage an easier sell to the public. At least one study has shown 
that the very words “gay” and “lesbian” can bring implicit bias—the 
sort of bias that people are either unwilling or unable to acknowledge, 
 
 220. Id. 
 221. MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, FROM DISGUST TO HUMANITY 205–06 (2010) 
(suggesting that cultivating empathy—the ability to place yourself in another’s shoes—is a 
promising way to move past disgust and toward humanity for gays and lesbians). 
 222. Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, supra note 12, at 794. 
 223. YOSHINO, COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT, supra note 48, at ix. 
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or both—against sexual minorities to the surface.224 If that is right, 
then framing gay marriage in a way that omits the “gay” might make 
people less anxious and more supportive of it. As mentioned earlier, 
our study provides some support for this proposition, as we found 
that any reasoning—and, to some extent, equality-based reasoning in 
particular—makes people less receptive to Supreme Court decisions 
vindicating same-sex marriage. Thus understood, framing marriage 
for “gays” as marriage for “all adults” might serve the strategic ends 
of winning marriage for gays and alleviating pluralism anxiety for all 
of us. 
However, framing same-sex marriage a certain way simply in 
order to appease the public is no less problematic than framing sexual 
orientation discrimination as sex discrimination or as conceptualizing 
marriage discrimination against gays and lesbians as the 
contemporary incarnation of Jim Crow.225 Each of these arguments 
substitutes one kind of discrimination (liberty, sex, race) for another 
(gay/lesbian). Each has a “transvestic quality”226 that camouflages gay 
 
 224. Implicit Association Test, PROJECT IMPLICIT, https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/ 
(last visited Sept. 3, 2014). The word “homosexual” apparently triggers even more implicit 
bias than the more politically correct “gay” and “lesbian.” According to a New York 
Times poll conducted before the military’s exclusionary policy was lifted, 42% of 
Americans opposed allowing “homosexuals” to serve openly in the military, whereas only 
28% opposed allowing “gay men and lesbians” to serve openly. See Geoffrey R. Stone, 
Gays and Lesbians or Homosexuals?, HUFF. POST (Apr. 15, 2010, 5:12 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/geoffrey-r-stone/gays-and-lesbians-or-homo_b_
461668.html. Indeed, the results of the New York Times poll helps explain why the only 
opinion to mention the word “homosexuals” and its variants in the Supreme Court’s most 
recent landmark gay rights case, United States v. Windsor, is that of Justice Scalia—in 
dissent. See, e.g., United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2709 (2013) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
 225. With respect to the sex-discrimination argument, Edward Stein contends that it 
“mischaracterizes the core wrong of these laws [that discriminate against gays and 
lesbians],” which are motivated, in his view, not by sexism but rather by a particular moral 
view of gays and lesbians. Edward Stein, Evaluating the Sex Discrimination Argument for 
Lesbian and Gay Rights, 49 UCLA L. REV. 471, 503–04 (2001). “[B]y failing to address 
arguments about the morality of same-sex sexual acts and the moral character of lesbians, 
gay men, and bisexuals,” he argues, “the sex-discrimination argument ‘closets,’ rather than 
confronts, homophobia.” Id. With respect to the race-discrimination argument, one of us 
contends that it ignores the centuries-old history of discrimination that such laws 
embody—discrimination that is unique to gays and lesbians. See Courtney Megan Cahill, 
(Still) Not Fit to Be Named: Moving Beyond Race to Explain Why ‘Separate’ Nomenclature 
for Gay and Straight Relationships Will Never Be ‘Equal,’ 97 GEO. L.J. 1155, 1159–62 
(2009). 
 226. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF THE 
CLOSET 223–24 (2009). 
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and lesbian discrimination in the “garb” of something else. To quote 
Edward Stein, each “closets, rather than confronts, homophobia.”227 
Casting exclusionary marriage laws as a liberty violation rather 
than an equality violation of gays and lesbians also “closets rather 
than confronts, homophobia”228—as well as its targets. In so doing, 
the liberty argument reflects a centuries-old legal tradition of not 
“naming” gays and lesbians229—a legal tradition embraced in Bowers 
v. Hardwick230 and only moderately rejected in Lawrence v. Texas,231 
one of the Court’s most pro-gay-rights decisions to date. To be sure, 
suppressing the equality demands of all identity groups, not just those 
of sexual minorities, has the effect of covering those groups. 
However, suppressing the equality demands of gays and lesbians in 
particular—and thereby covering their identity—is arguably worse 
given gays’ unique history of covering (and of being covered). 
A reading of the Supreme Court’s most recent gay rights case, 
United States v. Windsor,232 suggests that the Court has continued this 
long tradition of covering gay identity. It is worth briefly looking at 
Windsor because it at once departs from Yoshino’s theory and 
reinforces it. Windsor strikes down section 3 of DOMA primarily on 
equality, not liberty, grounds—thus suggesting that Yoshino erred in 
his prediction that the Supreme Court would continue to lead with 
 
 227. Stein, supra note 225, at 504. 
 228. Id.  
 229. Sodomy—the behavioral metonym of gay identity—was long known as the “crime 
that shall not be named.” 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *215. For 
commentary on sodomy as the metonym of gay identity, see Janet E. Halley, Reasoning 
About Sodomy: Act and Identity in and After Bowers v. Hardwick, 79 VA. L. REV. 1721, 
1722 (1993). As recently as 1986, the Supreme Court invoked that trope to refer to what it 
understood to be gay sex, see Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 197 (1986) (Burger, C.J., 
concurring), a description of which the Court relegated to a place “named after the foot, 
that lowly organ which spends its life near the ground, in the dirt,” J.M. Balkin, The 
Footnote, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 273, 275 (1989). And even though Lawrence v. Texas 
overruled Bowers and brought the definition of sodomy from footnote to text, see 
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003), it, too, participated in that tradition of un-
naming by discussing the “conduct,” but even more so the “right” at issue in that case, in 
such an oblique and abstract way that it is often difficult to tell what, exactly, the Lawrence 
majority is saying, see Heather Gerken, supra note 215, at 847 (stating that the opening of 
the majority opinion in Lawrence is “lovely” but then asking: “But what on earth does it 
mean?”); Mary Anne Case, Of “This” and “That” in Lawrence v. Texas, 2003 SUP. CT. 
REV. 75, 75–77; Tribe, supra note 105, at 1898–99. 
 230. 476 U.S. at 196–97. 
 231. 539 U.S. at 578–79; see also Eyer, supra note 148, at 8 (arguing that Lawrence at 
most represents a jurisprudence of “tolerance”—not one of full “recognition”). 
 232. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
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liberty in future civil rights cases, as it did in Lawrence.233 By 
mentioning the word “equality” and its variants more than a dozen 
times throughout its opinion, the majority strongly suggests that it was 
deciding Windsor on the basis of equality, or of what it calls “equal 
dignity.”234 
At the same time, though, Windsor could also be read as the 
Court’s attempt to quell pluralism anxiety by covering gay identity—
in the same way that universalizing liberty arguments, which omit any 
reference to “gays” and “lesbians,” do. Aside from three moments 
where the majority quotes from DOMA’s legislative record,235 it 
nowhere mentions the words “gay, “lesbian,” “homosexuality,” or 
their variants; as Noa Ben-Asher has recently observed, Windsor is 
“striking for . . . the conspicuous absence of the words ‘homosexual,’ 
‘lesbian,’ or ‘bisexual,’ ”236 particularly striking in light of the fact that 
its named plaintiff, Edith Windsor, argued that DOMA discriminated 
against her on the basis of sexual orientation.237 The majority opinion 
does not argue, as the Second Circuit did,238 that section 3 harms gays 
and lesbians, notwithstanding the fact that “moral disapproval of 
homosexuality” was very much on Congress’s mind when it passed 
section 3—language from the legislative record that not only came up 
 
 233. But see NeJaime, supra note 108, at 220 (arguing that while the Windsor majority 
technically struck down section 3 on equal protection grounds, it is “conceptually, if not 
doctrinally, a right-to-marry case”). 
 234. To be sure, in invoking the “equal dignity of same-sex marriages,” the Windsor 
Court adverted to a concept with close associations to liberty: dignity. According to 
Laurence Tribe, “dignity” is the concept that unites the two interlocking strands of the 
Fourteenth Amendment: equality and liberty. See Tribe, supra note 105, at 1898. Yoshino 
refers to hybrid liberty and equality claims as “dignity” claims, thus suggesting that he 
would interpret Windsor as resting its holding, at least in part, on liberty. See Yoshino, The 
New Equal Protection, supra note 12, at 749. That said, Yoshino makes a distinction 
between “liberty-based” and “equality-based” dignity claims, depending “on whether the 
liberty or the equality dimension of the hybrid claim is ascendant.” Id. Given the Windsor 
majority’s repeated references to equality and “equal dignity,” as well as its reliance on 
canonical equal protection precedents like Moreno and Romer, it seems safe to say that it 
is one such case where equality was in the ascendant. See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2681–93. 
 235. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2683. 
 236. See Noa Ben-Asher, Conferring Dignity: The Metamorphosis of the Legal 
Homosexual, 37 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 243, 245 (2014). Ben-Asher further argues that 
“Windsor introduces us to the new legal homosexual: the ‘same-sex couple.’ ” Id. She later 
refers to this rhetorical strategy as an erasure of “the terms ‘homosexual’ [and] ‘lesbian’ ” 
and ultimately homosexual identity. Id. at 263. 
 237. Brief on the Merits for Respondent Edith Schlain Windsor at 17, Windsor, 133 S. 
Ct. 2675 (No. 12-307). 
 238. Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 185–88 (2d Cir. 2012) (finding that sexual 
minorities constituted a quasi-suspect class under the federal Equal Protection Clause and 
striking down section 3 under heightened judicial scrutiny), aff’d, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
CITE AS 93 N.C. L. REV. 303 (2015) 
362 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93 
during Windsor’s oral argument but also was cited directly by the 
Windsor majority.239 Nor does it recognize that marriage prohibitions 
like section 3 warrant heightened scrutiny because they harm a class 
which deserves that level of review—a finding made by several state 
and federal courts around the country in myriad gay rights contexts.240 
Rather, the majority argues that section 3 harms married same-
sex couples and interferes with the “equal dignity of same-sex 
marriages.” Gays and lesbians are alluded to only obliquely in dyadic 
terms as composing the “couple, whose moral and sexual choices the 
Constitution protects, see Lawrence.”241 The targeted class, in other 
words, is not gays and lesbians, but rather the relationships into which 
they presumptively enter.242 Nowhere does the Court acknowledge 
that marriage discrimination of this kind is relational discrimination, 
and that relational discrimination of this kind is gay and lesbian 
discrimination.243 This omission is curious in light of the fact that both 
the Supreme Court and lower federal courts have found that 
discrimination against same-sex relationships is synonymous with 
discrimination against gays and lesbians.244 In so doing, the Court 
(and lower courts) has suggested that relational discrimination and 
status discrimination is a distinction without a difference. 
 
 239. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, at 16 (1996)). 
 240. See, e.g., Pedersen v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 881 F. Supp. 2d 294, 334 (D. Conn. 
2012) (finding that “homosexuals warrant judicial recognition as a suspect classification” 
although striking down DOMA under rational basis review only); Golinski v. U.S. Office 
of Pers. Mgmt., 824 F. Supp. 2d 968, 985–90 (N.D. Cal. 2012); Varnum v. Brien, 763 
N.W.2d 862, 885–96 (Iowa 2009). 
 241. 133 S. Ct. at 2694. 
 242. In this sense, the Windsor Court embraces an “entity” rather than “associational” 
view of marriage, similar to the approach currently taken in the law of partnership. See 
UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 201 (amended 1997), 6 U.L.A. 91 (2001). 
 243. See, e.g., Douglas NeJaime, Marriage Inequality: Same-Sex Relationships, 
Religious Exemptions, and the Production of Sexual Orientation Discrimination, 100 
CALIF. L. REV. 1169, 1196 (2012) (making this argument). 
 244. See, e.g., Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of the Law 
v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 689 (2010) (“declin[ing] to distinguish between status and 
conduct in this context [of sexual orientation]”); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575 
(2003) (finding that discrimination on the basis of “homosexual conduct” constitutes 
discrimination against gays and lesbians as a class); Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1081 
(9th Cir. 2012) (finding that “marriage” discrimination constitutes discrimination against 
gays and lesbians as a class), vacated sub nom. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 
2659 (2013); Bishop v. United States ex. rel. Holder, 962 F. Supp. 2d 1252, 1287 (N.D. 
Okla. 2014) (stating that discrimination on the basis of a “same-sex marriage” amounts to 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation because the conduct, same-sex marriage, 
“is so closely correlated with being homosexual that sexual orientation provides the best 
descriptor for the class-based distinction being drawn”). 
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Windsor’s peculiar reasoning “covers” sexual orientation identity 
no less than universalizing liberty arguments do and therefore 
illustrates what we believe is problematic about judicial arguments 
that effectively closet the very class that seeks constitutional redress. 
The only time the Court comes close to recognizing that DOMA 
harms gay and lesbian persons rather than just “same-sex marriages” 
is when it says that “the principal purpose and necessary effect of this 
law [DOMA] are to demean those persons who are in a lawful same-
sex marriage.”245 But even here one wonders why Justice Kennedy did 
not just say who, precisely, “those persons”246 are. Moreover, it seems 
rather uncontroversial to say that another “necessary effect” of 
DOMA is to “demean” even “those persons” who are not in a “lawful 
same-sex marriage”247 but whom DOMA nevertheless symbolically 
touches: all gays and lesbians, an entire class of persons rendered 
presumptively unfit for marriage under DOMA. 
Covering over sexual orientation identity in this way—and in the 
way that Yoshino’s theory appears to require—elides the history of 
discrimination that underwrites and motivates both DOMA and other 
laws that discriminate against gays and lesbians. We are wary of 
judicial covering of this sort, failing as it does “to make significant 
moral claims”248 about the status of gays and lesbians in American 
society as well as about why laws that exclude them from various 
spheres of American public life warrant condemnation. We agree 
with Yoshino that the language in which courts vindicate the rights of 
the subjects before them matters,249 but we disagree with him as to 
why that is so. In his view, language ought to serve the goal of gaining 
a right (say, marriage) in a way that is unobjectionable to the 
people—in a way that assuages, rather than incites, pluralism anxiety 
(and possibly backlash as well). In our view, language ought to serve 
the goal of gaining a right (say, marriage) in a way that vindicates the 
dignity of those individuals who seek it. Indeed, “even if advocates 
may feel compelled to offer every argument that might persuade a 
court, judges, in selecting among those arguments, have a choice 
about the language and the light in which they cast the subjects who 
 
 245. 133 S. Ct. at 2695. 
 246. Id. 
 247. Id. 
 248. Stein, supra note 225, at 505. 
 249. See Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, supra note 12, at 793–94 (discussing the 
ramifications of framing the marriage-equality claim as an equality right for gays and 
lesbians or as a liberty right that is universally enjoyed). 
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appear before them.”250 We strongly reject a choice that hides subjects 
behind the universalizing rhetoric of liberty. 
Thus, even if we did find strong support for the idea that the 
rhetoric of liberty has a purchase that the rhetoric of equality lacks, 
we believe that there is still good reason to reject Yoshino’s tactical 
advice.251 Rather than submerge equality in favor of liberty, we favor 
the doctrinal strategy relied on by the Executive Branch—which 
repudiated DOMA for reasons relating to equality, not liberty, in its 
2011 announcement252—as well as by most federal courts that have 
struck down exclusionary marriage laws, including DOMA.253 
B. Liberty As Bias Avoidance 
Our second normative objection concerns the issue of implicit 
bias and how best to manage it. As already mentioned, implicit bias 
might explain why we found a negative effect of both the liberty 
rationale and the equality rationale when compared to the neutral 
rationale. In addition, implicit bias might explain why equality-based 
rationales had more negative effects than did liberty-based rationales 
(albeit only at the margins). If people do react negatively to equality-
based reasoning because such reasoning triggers unconscious bias 
 
 250. Ben-Asher, supra note 236, at 284. 
 251. We are reminded of an observation made by Michael Sandel nearly twenty-five 
years ago, also in the context of gay rights. Sandel argued then that the “neutral case for 
toleration [of homosexuality]” is undesirable because it “leaves wholly unchallenged the 
adverse views of homosexuality itself.” Michael Sandel, Moral Argument and Liberal 
Toleration: Abortion and Homosexuality, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 521, 537 (1989). “Unless those 
views can be plausibly addressed,” he maintained,  
even a Court ruling in their favor is unlikely to win for homosexuals more than a 
thin and fragile toleration. A fuller respect would require, if not admiration, at 
least some appreciation of the lives homosexuals live. Such appreciation, however, 
is unlikely to be cultivated by a legal and political discourse conducted in terms of 
autonomy rights alone. 
Id. In this sense, liberty arguments reflect what Eskridge has called a politics of 
“toleration” rather than one of “recognition.” See William Eskridge, Jr., Lawrence’s 
Jurisprudence of Tolerance: Judicial Review to Lower the Stakes of Identity Politics, 88 
MINN. L. REV. 1021, 1086 (2004). 
 252. See Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Att’y Gen., to Hon. John A. Boehner, 
Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives (Feb. 23, 2011), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/February/11-ag-223.html. 
 253. See Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 188 (2d Cir. 2012) (striking down 
section 3 of DOMA under the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution), aff’d, 
133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013); Pedersen v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 881 F. Supp. 2d 294, 347 (D. 
Conn. 2012) (striking down section 3 of DOMA under the Equal Protection Clause); 
Golinski v. U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 824 F. Supp. 2d 968, 1002 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (striking 
down section 3 of DOMA under the Equal Protection Clause). 
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against same-sex marriage, sexual minorities, or both, then Yoshino’s 
suggestion that courts downplay the equality claims of discrete 
identity groups when vindicating those groups’ civil rights254 might be 
read as a strategy of bias-avoidance or bias-containment. Thus 
understood, Yoshino’s suggested strategy is unappealing because it 
urges courts to do the very thing—avoid confrontation with anxiety-
provoking identity categories—that implicit bias scholarship cautions 
against. 
If first generation implicit bias scholarship aimed to show that 
implicit bias not only exists but also influences behavior, then second 
generation implicit bias scholarship—where we are today—aims to 
devise the best way to manage it.255 Scholars from a number of fields 
have recently argued that the optimal way to deal with implicit bias is 
to confront, rather than evade, the identity categories that precipitate 
it.256 For instance, in their work on race and juries, Samuel Sommers 
and Phoebe Ellsworth have found that white jurors who attempt to 
avoid seeing race in cases involving white and black parties—that is, 
jurors who champion the ideal of colorblindness—are actually more 
biased in those cases.257 Indeed, Sommers and Ellsworth have found 
that there is something about trying to avoid confrontation with the 
category of race that makes people more racially biased.258 
Conversely, when white jurors suspend the colorblindness ideal and 
confront race, they are less racially biased.259 
 
 254. See Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, supra note 12, at 796 (arguing that 
“[e]quality claims inevitably involve the Court in picking favorites among groups, a 
practice attended by pluralism anxiety” whereas “[l]iberty claims, in contrast, emphasize 
what all Americans (or, more precisely, all persons within the jurisdiction of the United 
States) have in common”). 
 255. See Kang, Implicit Bias, supra note 88, at 1126 (stating in 2012 that “[g]iven the 
substantial and growing scientific literature on implicit bias, the time has now come to 
confront a critical question: What, if anything, should we do about implicit bias in the 
courtroom?”); John Powell & Rachel Godsil, Implicit Bias Insights As Preconditions to 
Structural Change, POVERTY & RACE, Sept.–Oct. 2011, at 3. 
 256. See infra notes 259–68 and accompanying text. 
 257. See Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Race in the Courtroom: 
Perceptions of Guilt and Dispositional Attributions, 26 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 
BULL. 1367, 1374 (2000); Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, “Race Salience” in 
Juror Decision-Making: Misconceptions, Clarifications, and Unanswered Questions, 27 
BEHAV. SCI. & L. 599, 608 (2009); Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, White 
Juror Bias: An Investigation of Prejudice Against Black Defendants in the American 
Courtroom, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 201, 218 (2001) [hereinafter Sommers & 
Ellsworth, White Juror Bias]. 
 258. See Sommers & Ellsworth, White Juror Bias, supra note 257, at 225. 
 259. Id. 
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Other scholars have similarly found that “actively contemplating 
others’ psychological experiences weakens the automatic expression 
of racial biases.”260 For instance, white individuals who adopt the 
perspective of black individuals—who place themselves in the 
proverbial shoes of the latter—are less likely to exhibit automatic bias 
against them.261 Based on these and other studies, legal commentators 
have argued that judges ought to encourage juries “to be conscious of 
race, gender, and other social categories.”262 They point to “evidence 
[that] suggests that it is precisely this greater degree of discussion, and 
even confrontation [with social categories], that can potentially 
decrease the amount of biased decisionmaking.”263 These kinds of 
“perspective-taking interventions,” scholars observe, “substantially 
decreased implicit bias in the form of negative attitudes.”264 Their 
recommendations are consistent with those of law-and-mind scholars 
like Terry Maroney, who has argued that judges are their most 
effective when they consciously and deliberately engage, rather than 
evade, uncomfortable emotions and the stimuli that provoke them.265 
They are also consistent with empirical data that show that 
“consciously held beliefs and values about equality . . . can override 
the effect of automatically activated prejudice . . . toward 
outgroups.”266 
Yoshino’s proposal deviates from the debiasing interventions 
suggested above. Rather than engage with social categories like race, 
gender, and sexual orientation, Yoshino’s tactical advice encourages 
judges to avoid those categories in order to serve the larger goal of 
managing the public’s pluralism anxiety—or, as we suspect, its 
implicit bias, given the likely relationship between those two things. 
Where implicit bias experts advocate direct engagement with the 
social categories that precipitate implicit bias in order to decrease it, 
Yoshino advocates the muting of those same categories in order to 
avoid it. In this sense, Yoshino’s suggested strategy does nothing to 
 
 260. Kang, Implicit Bias, supra note 88, at 1185 (summarizing this research). 
 261. Id. (observing that “perspective-taking interventions substantially decreased 
implicit bias in the form of negative attitudes, as measured by both a variant of the 
standard IAT (the personalized IAT) and the standard race attitude IAT”). 
 262. Id. at 1184. 
 263. Id. 
 264. Id. at 1185. 
 265. Terry A. Maroney, Emotional Regulation and Judicial Behavior, 99 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1485, 1492 (2011). 
 266. Nilanjana Dasgupta & Luis M. Rivera, From Automatic Antigay Prejudice to 
Behavior: The Moderating Role of Conscious Beliefs About Gender and Behavioral 
Control, 91 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 268, 277 (2006). 
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address implicit bias (or, in his words, “anxiety”)—and, ironically, 
might even perpetuate it.267 
To be sure, we are not suggesting that Supreme Court opinions 
ought to function as debiasing devices. Indeed, the primary purpose 
of Court decisions is to “say what the law is,”268 not to cure the 
public’s implicit bias against social outgroups like sexual minorities. 
That said, we object to Yoshino’s recommendation not because 
we think that it will ultimately fail to remedy Americans’ implicit bias. 
Rather, we object to his recommendation because we do not think 
that judges, among other legal actors, ought to be encouraged to 
engage in bias-minimizing strategies. Perhaps it is very well true that 
few people read Supreme Court opinions and even fewer understand 
them. Our study provides at least some support for that proposition 
(given the extremely low level of subject comprehension that we 
found); in that sense, our study coheres with a wealth of social science 
data that paint a rather dim picture of the relationship between 
Supreme Court opinions and the public’s engagement with them.269 
That does not mean, however, that the nation’s most respected 
branch of government270 ought to be embracing strategies that 
perpetuate implicit prejudice against outgroups—or, at the very least, 
strategies that do very little to eliminate that prejudice. Given the 
judiciary’s perceived stature in American public life, we believe that it 
ought to lead by example—and that minimizing the salient 
characteristics of groups when vindicating their civil rights is less than 
exemplary. 
 
 267. If colorblindness can perpetuate (rather than alleviate) racial bias, as scholars 
have found, then it is at the very least conceivable that decisions committed to “social 
category blindness” do not just fail to alleviate bias but even perpetuate it on some level. 
We understand that the results of our study do not strongly support this claim. If, as we 
found, Supreme Court reasoning does not really affect public acceptance of a decision, 
then it is unlikely that Supreme Court reasoning would affect implicit bias. If people are 
not affected by reasons in terms of acceptance, then it is unlikely that they will be affected 
by reasons in terms of implicit bias. That said, we are mostly concerned here with 
Yoshino’s belief that the Court cares about pluralism anxiety (and, by implication, implicit 
bias)—both its own and that of the people. If that is right, then we believe that the Court 
at the very least ought to engage the best strategy to manage that bias. If implicit bias 
scholars are right, then the best strategy is one that engages, rather than deflects, the social 
categories that purportedly trigger bias. 
 268. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803). 
 269. See supra notes 110–44 and accompanying text. 
 270. See Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, supra note 12, at 754 n.55. 
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CONCLUSION 
Our study tested empirically a theoretical claim commonly made 
by scholars of constitutional law: that Supreme Court reasoning 
matters in the court of public opinion. The most recent version of this 
claim comes from Professor Kenji Yoshino, who argues that courts 
can alleviate pluralism anxiety, and presumably contain public 
backlash, in decisions vindicating civil rights by leading with liberty 
and downplaying equality in those decisions. Our intuition was that 
Yoshino’s belief in the power of judicial reasoning was wrong as a 
positive matter. If, as Professors Braman and Fontana recently found, 
the public does not really care about which institutional actor resolves 
a high salience issue, then why would it care about something even 
more nuanced and granular, namely how an issue is decided? If that 
intuition is correct, then Yoshino’s tactical advice to courts is not only 
normatively undesirable (as we believe and argue) but also 
descriptively inaccurate. 
Our results do not alter our intuition. Yoshino’s tactical advice to 
courts—that they lead with liberty in order to quell the public’s 
pluralism anxiety—is not robustly endorsed by our results, since we 
do not find that liberty increases acceptance or agreement when 
compared to a no-rationale decision. Nor do we find the negative 
effects of equality significantly pervasive to convince us that equality 
is that much worse than liberty (indeed, if anything, our results 
suggest that both are bad in terms of decreasing public support). 
Perhaps most important, even if Yoshino is correct that liberty does a 
better job than equality in containing backlash, his advice must be 
weighed against the significant normative concerns that follow from 
it—particularly when it comes to gay rights. 
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gender. In response, opponents have argued that the Constitution only 
protects traditional marriages and families, and that same-sex marriage 
is not mentioned in the Constitution. These opponents have argued that 
a Supreme Court decision protecting marriage between same-sex 
couples would be unwise. 
The Supreme Court held oral arguments on marriage between 
same-sex couples, which were presented by the lawyers for same-sex 
marriage advocacy groups and by the lawyers for groups opposing 
same-sex marriage. After these arguments were presented to the Court, 
the members of the Court engaged in private discussions about the 
case. 
Just a few days ago, the Supreme Court decided the case—and 
advocates of marriage for same-sex couples are very pleased. The new 
decision requires the federal government and state governments to 
permit same-sex couples to marry. The Supreme Court’s decision stated 
that everyone should be able to marry the person of their choice under 
the Constitution. Marriage, the Court declared, is a fundamental right 
for all adults and laws that prohibit same-sex marriage violate that right. 
Advocates of marriage for same-sex couples praised the new 
decision as a “major step forwards in the history of American civil rights 
and a vindication of the Constitution” while opponents criticized the 
decision as a “blow to the people and traditions of the United States 
and to the importance of the institution of traditional marriage.”  
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advocacy groups and by the lawyers for groups opposing same-sex 
marriage. After these arguments were presented to the Court, the 
members of the Court engaged in private discussions about the case. 
Just a few days ago, the Supreme Court decided the case—and 
advocates of marriage for same-sex couples are very pleased. The new 
decision requires the federal government and state governments to 
permit same-sex couples to marry. The Supreme Court’s decision stated 
that the Constitution prohibits the government from discriminating 
against people by singling them out for differential treatment on the 
basis of a particular characteristic—which is exactly what the 
government does when it prohibits gay people from marrying the person 
of their choice because they are gay.  
Advocates of marriage for same-sex couples praised the new 
decision as a “major step forward in the history of American civil rights 
and a vindication of the Constitution” while opponents criticized the 
decision as a “blow to the people and traditions of the United States 
and to the importance of the institution of traditional marriage.”  
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